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INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes toppling one of the Erie doctrine’s most prominent 
pillars.1 The relevant line of Erie jurisprudence governs a frequently recurring 
question in federal litigation: When federal and state law appear to conflict, which 
law should a court apply? 
An abstract example illustrates the question’s significance and difficulty. 
Suppose that the parties in a federal diversity action dispute whether the court 
should apply federal law or state law to resolve a particular issue. The court’s choice 
would end the case. One party would prevail under federal law, while the other 
would prevail under state law. The court’s choice of law would also have 
ramifications beyond determining the case’s outcome. Applying the wrong law 
would impair the spurned lawmaker’s regulatory interests, raising federalism and 
separation of powers concerns. Yet both options may seem wrong. State law is often 
incongruous in federal court, while federal law can be gratuitous in a diversity action 
that does not involve a federal claim. So how should the court decide which law 
applies? And how does that choice of law implicate related issues, such as the 
boundary between interpretation and lawmaking and the legitimacy of federal 
common law? 
Civil procedure students learn two answers to the choice-of-law puzzle. They 
start with a soothing formal rule and then drift into the turbulence of a balancing 
test. Students first learn that federal courts apply federal procedural law and state 
substantive law. This tidy bifurcation seems plausible until someone asks: “What’s 
the difference?” Students then learn that courts do not really enforce a strict 
substance/procedure distinction. Instead, courts apply a two-pronged  
choice-of-law rule cobbled together from several Supreme Court decisions. The 
first prong gives automatic priority to most types of federal law, such as statutes 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second prong subjects the remaining 
type of federal law—judge-made common law—to a multi-factored “twin aims” 
test announced in Hanna v. Plumer.2 Even the Supreme Court concedes that the 
twin aims test is “relatively unguided.”3 
The Court’s unguided inquiry across slippery terrain produces disorientation. 
But the Court nevertheless believes that the current two-pronged method is an 
appropriate manifestation of policies animating Erie and its progeny. 
The unguided approach to choice of law in federal court is misguided for 
several reasons that this Article explores in depth. Current jurisprudence governing 
 
1. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
3. Id. at 471. 
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vertical choice of law suffers from at least four overlapping and fatal flaws.4 The 
Court’s approach: (1) relies on an arbitrary distinction between federal common law 
and statutory law; (2) elides the indeterminate boundary between lawmaking and 
interpretation; (3) ignores the judiciary’s statutorily delegated authority to fill gaps 
in procedural codes; and (4) fails to recognize that preemption doctrine 
implementing the Supremacy Clause should fill the choice-of-law role that courts 
mistakenly assign to doctrine implementing Hanna and Erie. 
Exposing current doctrine’s flaws reveals a superior approach to deciding 
when federal courts should apply federal law. This new approach has implications 
for many cutting-edge fields of scholarship that are not usually analyzed 
concurrently or in connection to Erie. For example, the Article raises questions 
about how substantive canons should influence interpretation of federal law, the 
difference between delegated and inherent lawmaking powers, the legitimacy of 
federal common law, and the discretion of administrative agencies. 
Part I develops a framework for fragmenting the multifaceted Erie doctrine 
into more precise components. This approach pierces the Erie doctrine’s daunting 
mystique to reveal that Erie is merely a label encompassing four distinct inquiries. 
Looking past the distracting Erie label brings the discrete inquiries that the label 
obscures into sharper focus. These inquiries address: 
(1) the creation of federal law (is an ostensibly applicable federal law 
valid?); 
(2) the interpretation of federal law (what does an ostensibly applicable 
federal law mean in the context of a particular case?); 
(3) the prioritization of federal law (if the ostensibly applicable federal 
law conflicts with state law, which controls?); and 
(4) the adoption of non-federal law (what law does a federal court 
apply when federal law is not applicable?). 
Discussion of Erie’s four inquiries provides context for considering how each 
inquiry influences the others. A more refined taxonomy can also illuminate 
doctrinal mistakes that invocations of an amorphous “Erie doctrine” obscure. 
Dividing Erie into its components reveals that the creation and interpretation 
inquiries should perform the analytical work that the Court currently ascribes to the 
prioritization inquiry. The current inquiry into whether federal law has priority 
distracts from the more salient questions of whether the federal law is valid and 
whether it encompasses the disputed issue. 
Using my terminology, a court confronting a conflict between federal and state 
law must consider: (1) whether the federal lawmaker had authority to create the 
federal rule; and (2) how broadly to interpret the rule. These two inquiries often occur 
in tandem. For example, doubts about whether Congress can create a given rule 
 
4. A choice between federal and state law is “vertical” in a hierarchical federal system, while the 
choice between the laws of coequal states is “horizontal.” Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine  
Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1999). 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
2020] UNIFIED APPROACH 1105 
may warrant interpreting a statute narrowly to preserve its validity. Likewise, doubts 
about whether a federal court should create federal common law may warrant 
restraint both in creating a rule and interpreting its scope. Prioritization of federal 
law becomes relevant only after the creation and interpretation inquiries are 
complete. If a federal law was validly created and a proper interpretation renders it 
applicable, then federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause. There 
is no need for a fuzzy prioritization inquiry. And if federal law was either improperly 
created or cannot apply based on a proper interpretation, then prioritization is moot. 
Accordingly, emphasizing creation and interpretation rather than the current 
“twin aims” prioritization inquiry would more effectively address separation of 
powers and federalism concerns that should inform vertical choice of law. Federal 
courts should not apply a fuzzy test to decide whether a valid federal law has priority 
over state law. Instead, under the Supremacy Clause, valid federal law always 
preempts state law on matters within the federal law’s scope. The hard questions 
are whether ostensibly applicable federal laws are valid exercises of federal 
lawmaking power that can or should be interpreted to conflict with state law. 
Part II provides a new framework for organizing modern prioritization 
jurisprudence and isolating the Supreme Court’s contestable assumptions. It 
challenges conventional wisdom by showing that Hanna’s “twin aims” test relies on 
an arbitrary distinction between federal common law and other forms of federal 
law, implements that distinction poorly, and cannot rely on the oft-cited but 
inapposite Rules of Decision Act (RDA).5 
The twin aims test is essentially a substantive canon of interpretation 
masquerading as a choice-of-law rule. It fails at both tasks. Building a new “Erie 
canon” from scratch would produce a more sensible approach to interpretation. 
And replacing the twin aims test with an emphasis on preemption would produce a 
more sensible approach to prioritization. 
Part III provides the first account of how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) authorize federal courts to create preemptive common law through the 
“any manner” clause in FRCP 83(b).6 This power has been hiding in plain sight for 
eighty years. Yet courts and commentators have not addressed its significance for 
Erie. The Article shows that the foundational premise of the Supreme Court’s 
prioritization jurisprudence is wrong because the supposed line between formal 
rules and judge-made law either does not exist or is unworkably faint. This insight 
extends beyond the FRCP context to other forms of common law that apply in 
federal court. 
Federal common law is often a Bermuda Triangle of constitutional 
jurisprudence. This locus of myth and mystery leads courts to either misperceive or 
 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018). 
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (“Procedure When there is No Controlling Law. A judge may regulate 
practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, 
and the district’s local rules.”). 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
1106 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1101 
steer clear of federal common law’s conceptual challenges. Closer scrutiny—using 
forum non conveniens doctrine as an example—reveals how current Erie 
jurisprudence provides a misguided account of federal common law’s priority. 
Part IV develops a new approach to prioritization and spotlights policy 
questions about the validity and scope of federal law. This Part contends that the 
Supremacy Clause, rather than Erie, resolves priority questions in federal court 
through ordinary preemption principles. The policy questions that courts currently 
consider when assessing priority are better suited to Erie’s creation and 
interpretation inquiries. These inquiries directly analyze: (1) whether the federal 
government has authority to create law covering particular issues; (2) which federal 
institutions—Congress or the judiciary—can create law; and (3) when federal courts 
should interpret federal law broadly or narrowly if it potentially conflicts with state 
law. Scholarship addressing the origins and optimal content of federal law is 
therefore relevant to Erie in ways that the current prioritization inquiry obscures. 
In sum, the Article suggests reorienting Erie analysis in three ways. First, courts 
implementing the prioritization inquiry should not apply Hanna’s “twin aims” test, 
which is irredeemably flawed. Second, the arbitrary line that separates “choice of 
law” under Hanna from “preemption” under the Supremacy Clause should 
disappear, leaving a single preemption test for all conflicts between federal and state 
law. The prioritization inquiry should therefore consider only the Supremacy Clause, 
such that in virtually all cases a valid federal law will displace state law on matters 
within its scope. Third, deemphasizing prioritization will highlight the importance 
of the creation and interpretation inquiries. Courts must focus on when federal 
institutions may create federal law, how to interpret the scope of federal law, and 
whether to embrace or avoid conflicts with state law. These sensitive policy 
questions would benefit from direct attention and should not be blurred with 
distracting questions about federal law’s priority. Accordingly, this Article’s 
approach would make choice-of-law analysis less arbitrary and more directly 
engaged with the federalism and separation of powers concerns at Erie’s core. 
I. SITUATING THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW IN THE 
BROADER CONTEXT OF ERIE JURISPRUDENCE 
Vertical choice-of-law jurisprudence is confusing because Erie has become 
fossilized in discordant layers of gloss. The opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 
makes only a narrow point limiting the federal judiciary’s authority to enforce 
“general law” that displaces state law.7 Yet the broader “Erie doctrine” entangles 
several concepts that are not directly connected to the eponymous case. Courts 
routinely cite Erie as the foundation for sweeping propositions about the contours 
of federalism, limits of judicial power, and even the nature of law.8 Because the case 
 
7. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). 
8. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974); Ernest  
A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 193, 213 (2018). Erie’s susceptibility to multiple 
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is simultaneously venerated and poorly understood, citations to Erie often are 
ornaments rather than arguments. Jurisprudence built on such a tenuous foundation 
is ripe for reexamination. 
The Erie doctrine is best understood as an amalgam of four distinct 
components. Each component serves a different function using a discrete set of 
tools. Treating the components as separate inquiries enables clearer and more 
precise analysis. Even when the inquiries in practice overlap or occur in tandem, 
close attention to each inquiry’s goals and methods can improve decisionmaking. 
Section A briefly outlines my prior work defining Erie’s four components. 
This discussion provides context for the present Article, which explores the 
prioritization component in depth and explains how it relates to Erie’s other three 
components.9 Section B then explains how prioritization and interpretation can blur 
and how to avoid that blurring. 
Both sections focus on litigation in federal courts because the common law 
that the Article considers in Section III.A fills gaps in the FRCP, which do not apply 
in state courts.10 In addition, the creation and interpretation inquiries are more 
complicated when state, rather than federal, institutions develop federal law.11 My 
discussion of prioritization is relevant to cases in state courts, but further analysis 
would be necessary to address idiosyncratic aspects of state court litigation. 
Priority is especially salient when federal courts exercise diversity or 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim arising under state law.12 Cases arising under 
federal law also raise priority questions when state law governs aspects of a claim or 
defense, such as in many tax and bankruptcy actions. In these federal question cases, 
“federal law rests on a substructure of state-created interests.”13 
 
readings has led to evolving perceptions of its significance, such that “the iconic decision today is not 
what it used to be, and the case might not remain in the future what it is right now.” Craig Green, 
Erie and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History, 52 AKRON L. REV. 259, 260 (2018). 
9. See Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 579 (2013). 
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 81 (stating that the FRCP apply only in federal courts). 
11. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153  
U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005); Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006). 
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (2018); Erbsen, supra note 9, at 658 n.286 (discussing application 
of Erie’s interpretation inquiry in federal question and supplemental jurisdiction cases). An interesting 
question would arise if a case includes both federal and state claims and applying state law to the state 
claim would prejudice the federal claim. Cf. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.3 (1988) 
(noting but not resolving this issue in the context of venue transfer). 
13. Alfred Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 
101 (1955); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54  
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 535 (1954) (“Federal tax law, for example, can say what state-created interests are 
to be taxed . . . but it cannot create the interests.”); Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (2010) (noting that federal courts often “disregard the reality that they 
are being asked to interpret and apply criminal laws of other governments”); Thomas E. Plank, The 
Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 639 (2004) (“[F]ederal courts in 
bankruptcy have not developed any consistent theory on when they may overrule state law.”). 
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A. Overview of the Erie Doctrine’s Four Discrete Inquiries: Creation (Whether the 
Federal Law is Valid), Interpretation (What the Federal Law Means), Prioritization 
(How the Federal Law Interacts with State Law), and Adoption (Potential Sources of 
Non-Federal Law) 
A simple hypothetical fact pattern illustrates the Erie doctrine’s four separate 
functions. Suppose that a federal district court in California exercises diversity 
jurisdiction over a civil action between citizens of California and Michigan. The 
defendant’s lawyer repeatedly disrupts proceedings with inappropriate outbursts. 
Eventually, the Court invokes its inherent power to hold the obstreperous lawyer in 
civil contempt. The lawyer raises four objections to the contempt order: 
(1) federal district judges cannot impose contempt sanctions without 
a grant of statutory or FRCP authority that is absent here; 
(2) even if federal common law authorizes sanctions, the relevant 
rules do not encompass the facts of this case; 
(3) even if federal common law rules encompass the lawyer’s 
conduct, in a diversity action state law should apply and would 
compel a different result; and 
(4) as between Michigan and California law, California law  
should apply. 
Each of the lawyer’s four objections implicates one of the Erie doctrine’s four 
components. Assessing each objection requires invoking separate sets of ideas and 
precedents loosely connected to Erie. 
The first objection addresses the creation of federal law. The question is 
whether the federal government may create binding rules to resolve the disputed 
issue, and if so which federal institutions have lawmaking authority. As applied to 
the hypothetical above, the issue is whether Congress and/or the judiciary can 
create rules governing civil contempt in a diversity case. 
Erie’s creation inquiry animates several distinct strands of jurisprudence. For 
example, the creation inquiry addresses Congress’s authority to regulate particular 
fields,14 the judiciary’s authority to develop federal common law,15 and the Supreme 
Court’s authority to implement the Rules Enabling Act (REA).16 
The second objection addresses the interpretation of federal law. The question 
is whether a potentially applicable federal law encompasses the disputed issue. For 
 
14. See Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 31–32 (considering whether a statute was “a valid exercise of 
Congress’s authority”). 
15. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (“[W]here a court is asked to state or 
formulate a common law principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is not 
so much found or discovered as it is either made or created.”); id. at 729 (“[P]ost-Erie understanding 
has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common 
law way.”). 
16. See 28 U.S.C § 2072 (2018); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1941) (holding that 
Congress can delegate rulemaking power to the judiciary and that the Court complied with the 
delegation’s conditions). 
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example, does a federal contempt rule forbid a given type of behavior in a  
given context? 
Interpretation is necessary both when laws have a fixed text—such as the 
Constitution and statutes—and when laws develop through a common law process. 
Refining a common law rule’s scope combines policymaking with traditional 
interpretive methods, although theorists disagree about the optimal mix  
of techniques.17 
The third objection addresses the prioritization of federal law. If federal and 
state law conflict, the question is how to choose between them. In the hypothetical 
above, the court would ask whether federal common law that purports to govern 
contempt in diversity cases displaces inconsistent state law. 
Depending on the circumstances, courts implementing Erie’s prioritization 
inquiry apply a bright-line preemption rule or a fuzzy multi-factored test. Parts II 
through IV explore the prioritization inquiry in greater depth and contend that the 
bright-line rule should expand and replace the irredeemably flawed fuzzy test. 
The fourth objection addresses the adoption of non-federal law. If a federal 
court cannot apply a federal rule, then it must consider three questions about state 
law. First, which government’s rule applies (in the hypothetical, California’s or 
Michigan’s)? Second, which institution is an authoritative source of an applicable 
rule’s content—for example, the state legislature, the state’s highest court, or a lower 
state court? Third, what rule would that institution apply? The most prominent 
adoption case is Klaxon v. Stentor Electric, which requires federal courts to implement 
the forum state’s choice-of-law rules.18 The adoption component also encompasses 
jurisprudence articulating methods for ascertaining the content of state law19 and 
for addressing federal incorporation of state law.20 
Accordingly, the Erie doctrine is best understood as the sum of four 
components governing the creation, interpretation, and prioritization of federal law, 
and the adoption of non-federal law. These components determine which 
 
17. Compare RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985) (“[L]egal practice is an 
exercise in interpretation not only when lawyers interpret particular documents or statutes but 
generally.”), with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 261 (1990) (contending 
that “interpretation” entails using a set of methods that are needlessly restrictive when applying 
common law rather than statutes). 
18. 313 U.S. 487, 495–96 (1941). 
19. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4507 (3d  
ed. 2016) (“[T]he federal court must determine issues of state law as it believes the highest court of the 
state would presently determine them, not necessarily (although usually this will be the case) as they 
previously have been decided by other state courts.”). The FRCP provides a process for ascertaining 
the content of foreign law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome  
Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1872–73 (2018) (noting that Rule 44.1 replaced a  
“common-law” approach). 
20. A non-federal rule enforced in federal court can have one of two distinct statuses. It might 
apply of its own force, or it might apply because federal law incorporates its content. This distinction 
has several practical implications for subject-matter jurisdiction and choice-of-law methodology. See 
Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sovereign’s Law, 103 CORNELL 
L. REV. 243, 258–65 (2018). 
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governments, and which institutions within those governments, are authoritative 
sources of binding legal rules. My prior work defines and defends in greater depth 
this framework for thinking about Erie and its progeny.21 The present Article 
identifies critical flaws in the Court’s approach to prioritization. The Article then 
explains why the creation and interpretation inquiries can more appropriately 
address questions currently relegated to the prioritization inquiry. 
B. Relationship Between the Interpretation Inquiry (What a Federal Law Means) and the 
Prioritization Inquiry (How the Federal Law Interacts with State Law) 
The intersection between the prioritization and interpretation inquiries helps 
explain why Erie creates “confusion and more confusion.”22 In theory, courts can 
recharacterize any prioritization issue as an interpretation issue. The potential shell 
game leads to uncertainty about the proper boundary between the two inquiries. 
This Section explains why the two inquiries should remain distinct. Part II explores 
how modern doctrine overlooks the distinction. 
The contempt hypothetical above illustrates the potential overlap between 
interpretation and prioritization. We can frame the scope of a federal common law 
contempt rule in two ways: 
(1) a contempt sanction is appropriate when a lawyer does X; or  
(2) a contempt sanction is appropriate when a lawyer does X, unless 
the case arises in diversity jurisdiction and state law compels a 
different result. 
The more refined second formulation incorporates the federal rule’s interaction 
with state law into the federal rule’s definition. This refined approach to framing 
the federal contempt rule potentially blurs the interpretation and prioritization 
inquiries. It suggests that concerns about priority limit the federal contempt rule’s 
scope. Courts implementing the refined federal rule therefore need not ask whether 
federal law has priority over a conflicting state rule because a narrow interpretation 
of the federal rule avoids the conflict. By definition, federal and state law cannot 
conflict because federal law is defined in a way that defers to otherwise inconsistent 
state law. The priority question becomes moot and the interpretation inquiry does 
all the work. 
A skewed application of Erie’s interpretation inquiry—i.e., reading federal law 
narrowly to avoid conflict with state law—could potentially subsume the 
prioritization inquiry in all cases. The question of “when does federal law have 
priority over state law” would be avoided by reasoning that “there is no 
prioritization issue because federal law can be read as deferring to state law.” This 
interpretive move can be sensible if federal deference to state law is express, as in 
 
21. See Erbsen, supra note 9. 
22. Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie  
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 270 (1946). 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
2020] UNIFIED APPROACH 1111 
some statutes.23 Likewise, using interpretation as a means of avoiding conflict with 
state law can be prudent when federal courts have discretion about the breadth of 
the common law rules they create. 
The problem is that prudence can shade into unwarranted trepidation. A 
narrow interpretation of federal law seems like a gambit when deference is an 
arbitrary limit on an otherwise broad rule, as in the contempt scenario above. The 
outcome of this gambit would reflect a covert prioritization inquiry disguised as 
interpretation. The federal rule would receive a narrow reading not because 
conventional interpretive methods favor that narrow reading, but because the court 
thinks that Erie’s prioritization policies require deference to state law. 
Analytical shortcuts blur the policies underlying interpretation and 
prioritization at the expense of each inquiry. The interpretation analysis is weak 
because it incorporates questionable assumptions about priority. The prioritization 
analysis is weak because it relies on an interpretive fig leaf. 
Refining the prioritization and interpretation inquiries mitigates potential 
blurring. Clarifying what each inquiry should accomplish also helps courts confront 
the relevant policy questions more directly. 
We can think of the interpretation inquiry as fragmenting into  
three questions: 
(1) Setting aside choice-of-law concerns for the moment, does the 
relevant federal law encompass the disputed issue? 
(2) If the relevant federal law encompasses the disputed issue, does it 
conflict with state law? 
(3) If there is a conflict, do ordinary tools of interpretation—in 
contrast to assumptions about how prioritization should 
operate—indicate that the relevant federal law requires deferring 
to or rejecting inconsistent state law? 
If question one reveals that the relevant federal law does not encompass the 
disputed issue, and there is no reason to create new federal law to fill the gap, then 
priority is irrelevant. As the Court noted in Hanna, “state law must govern because 
there can be no other law.”24 Federal law, including federal common law, is available 
only when it has been validly created and appropriately interpreted. When federal 
law is not available, state law is the default. Foreign and international law can of 
course apply, but only if state choice-of-law rules select them.25 
 
23. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b) (2018) (“In a civil action brought to recover on account of an 
injury sustained in a place [subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction], the rights of the parties shall be 
governed by the law of the State in which the place is located.”). 
24. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965). 
25. See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam) (citing Klaxon 
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). For a critique of choice-of-law rules governing the 
application of foreign law in federal court, see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531 (2011). The Court appears to assume that each state has a body of law that 
applies uniformly within its borders. That assumption does not account for the nuances of local law, 
including local common law. See Annie Decker, A Theory of Local Common Law, 35 CARDOZO  
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The prior paragraph included an important caveat. Sometimes existing federal 
law does not encompass a disputed issue, and there is no reason for the court to fill 
the void with new federal common law. This caveat will not always apply. The 
interpretation inquiry sometimes will suggest that existing federal law does not 
encompass a disputed issue, yet the court will nevertheless want to apply a federal 
rule. This scenario implicates the creation inquiry. 
When the interpretation inquiry concludes that existing federal law does not 
address an issue, yet applying federal law seems desirable, the court must decide 
whether it can and should create a federal common law rule.26 This decision involves 
“choice of law” in the sense that the court chooses between creating a federal rule 
and allowing state law to fill a void.27 But this choice in the creation context is 
logically antecedent to the more traditional “choice of law” that occurs in the 
prioritization context.28 Both contexts involve a choice between federal and state 
law. However, the choice in the creation context implicates a complex constitutional 
calculus, while the choice in the prioritization context should be essentially 
automatic under the Supremacy Clause. Yet current prioritization doctrine enables 
Hanna’s “twin aims” test to infect the creation inquiry and distract from the relevant 
federalism and separation of powers concerns. Unjustified doubt about whether 
federal law has priority over state law leads to doubt about whether federal law can 
even exist in a particular context. This blurring of the creation and prioritization 
inquiries is a methodological error that my framework for parsing Erie seeks to 
prevent. Judicial decisions about whether to create federal common law, how 
broadly to interpret federal law, and when to prioritize federal law raise distinct 
kinds of problems. Courts should address these problems separately rather than by 
an unstructured invocation of “Erie.” 
Returning to the interpretation inquiry, if question one reveals that federal law 
encompasses the disputed issue, then question two requires interpreting state law to 
assess whether federal and state law conflict.29 When state law is so undeveloped 
 
L. REV. 1939 (2014) (noting local common law’s importance and obscurity). Federal courts applying 
state law must therefore carefully consider whether state law includes local variants that the federal 
court must respect. 
26. See infra Section II.B.4.a (discussing the contexts in which federal common law is available). 
27. Clermont, supra note 11, at 45 (noting that “preemption and judicial choice of law” have 
“adjacent places” in the process of implementing Erie); see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance,  
Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691 (2006) (characterizing as “choice-of-law” the decision whether to 
fashion a federal common law rule that displaces state law). 
28. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (characterizing the Court’s decision as 
addressing “choice of law in diversity actions”). 
29. If federal and state law are consistent, or the conflict is immaterial, then the prioritization 
inquiry does not merit discussion. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 374 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that prioritization is unnecessary when “all putatively applicable laws 
produce the same result.”); cf. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938) (opinion 
by Justice Brandeis observing that Erie has no practical effect when state law and general law  
are identical). 
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that there is insufficient grist for interpretation, Erie’s adoption inquiry requires 
predicting how the state’s highest court would rule.30 
Courts determining whether federal and state law conflict must have a 
methodology for interpreting state law. This methodology creates a separate Erie 
problem if federal and state methodologies would produce different interpretations. 
Abbe Gluck has persuasively argued that federal courts often should defer to state 
methods when interpreting state statutes.31 She frames her inquiry in terms of 
whether federal interpretive methods constitute preemptive law that displace 
inconsistent state methods.32 In other words, do federal methods have priority over 
state methods? This Article’s framework provides an alternative way of framing the 
question. Courts would ask: Can and should federal methods have a scope that is 
sufficiently broad to encompass state law questions? The applicability of federal 
methods would thus be a question for the creation and interpretation inquiries 
rather than the prioritization inquiry. 
Whatever interpretive method the federal court uses, it will ultimately come to 
a conclusion about an ostensibly applicable state law’s meaning. The court will then 
compare this conclusion about the state law’s meaning to its conclusion about the 
federal law’s meaning, and will decide if there is a conflict. 
If federal and state law seem to conflict, then question three requires using 
ordinary tools of interpretation to identify how federal law addresses its relationship 
with state law. This reliance on ordinary tools of interpretation distinguishes 
question three from the gambit described above in which courts skew interpretation 
of federal law based on dubious assumptions about its priority. Currently, concerns 
about implementing or avoiding Hanna’s fuzzy “twin aims” test can infect the 
interpretation inquiry and lead to flawed conclusions about the meaning of federal 
law. My framing of question three, coupled with my emphasis on preemption under 
the Supremacy Clause, is designed to shift judicial perspectives when interpreting 
federal law. Courts should not be concerned that prioritization will be difficult 
because preemption will be straightforward under the Supremacy Clause, in contrast 
to Hanna’s fuzzy test. The truly difficult issue involves ascertaining the meaning of 
federal law rather than determining its priority. That inquiry into meaning is an 
exercise that courts routinely conduct. There is no reason why conducting that 
inquiry in an “Erie” context requires departing from ordinary methods of 
interpretation. Instead, there is a subtler issue about whether the “Erie” context in 
 
30. See supra note 19; Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism 
and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1497 (1997) (“[C]ourts and commentators 
may disagree over the precise point at which interpretation ends and prediction begins.”). 
31. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as Law and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011). For a discussion of whether federal courts should defer to state 
methods for interpreting state common law, see Nina Varsava, Beyond Substance and Procedure: Precedent, 
Interpretation, and the Limits of Erie (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1495, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3238221 [https://perma.cc/U3SD-ZSXD].
32. See Gluck, supra note 31, at 1903. 
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which the interpretive question arises raises any unique questions for the court  
to address. 
Examples of context-sensitive interpretive questions include: Did the federal 
law’s creator perceive itself as supplying a definitive solution to a problem, or as 
providing a default rule to fill a void that state law could also fill in appropriate 
circumstances? And if state law sometimes displaces the federal default rule, does 
state law apply only in state court or also in federal court? These questions 
incorporate into Erie analysis concerns about a rule’s “scope” that animate  
choice-of-law doctrine.33 
If federal law defers to state law, then there is no conflict and no need for 
prioritization.34 The prioritization inquiry is necessary only if the relevant federal 
law expressly or implicitly rejects deference to a conflicting state law. 
As noted in Part IV, the existence of potentially conflicting state law may be a 
reason for interpreting federal law narrowly. For example, in some circumstances 
an Erie canon might warrant skewing interpretation of federal law toward 
deferential accommodation of state law.35 But a preference for deference would 
implicate the interpretation inquiry, not the prioritization inquiry, which operates 
only after courts adopt a definitive interpretation of the relevant federal law. 
Moreover, developing a canon would require courts to directly confront the policy 
issues that arise when federal and state law potentially conflict. This direct 
engagement with policy is preferable to an ad hoc process that enables Hanna’s 
flawed prioritization test to taint interpretation. 
In contrast to the three-step interpretation inquiry, the prioritization inquiry 
has only one step. When the interpretation inquiry concludes that a valid federal 
rule is broad enough to encompass the disputed issue and is inconsistent with state 
law, courts must decide whether federal or state law has priority. I argue in Parts  
II–IV that this inquiry should entail applying preemption principles and the 
Supremacy Clause rather than a multi-factored “twin aims” test. 
If reliance on preemption principles seems surprising, recall that we are 
assuming that the creation inquiry deems the relevant federal law to be valid. 
Accordingly, the rulemaker was empowered to choose federal law as the basis for 
decision. If the rulemaker made an unacceptable choice between federal and state 
law, then the problem really implicates Erie’s creation component rather than its 
prioritization component. The problem would be that a rulemaker created a federal 
law with broader consequences than the rulemaker was allowed to impose. So the 
 
33. Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and 
Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) (explaining how choice-of-law concepts can help resolve 
some of the Erie doctrine’s persistent puzzles). 
34. In some cases, federal law incorporates state law, such that federal and state law have similar 
content, albeit with several potential complications. See Erbsen, supra note 9, at 586–88 (discussing the 
difference between adopting and incorporating state law). 
35. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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solution should be to invalidate or fix the federal law rather than to manipulate the 
prioritization inquiry. 
We are also assuming that the court correctly interpreted the federal rule. 
Courts applying Erie’s prioritization component therefore must respect the 
rulemakers’ choice and implement the supreme federal law.36 
For convenience, the foregoing analysis treats the creation and interpretation 
inquiries as sequential. This approach has intuitive appeal because the decision to 
create a federal rule seems to precede efforts to interpret the rule. But in practice 
courts should apply the creation and interpretation inquiries iteratively. An iterative 
approach links questions about whether a rule is valid and what it means. Thus, the 
creation inquiry is not complete until the court has an interpretation to test. And 
the interpretation inquiry is not complete until the court knows the range of what 
the rulemaker can authorize. Accordingly, the interpretation and creation inquiries 
in practice are likely to occur in tandem, with one inquiry influencing the other. 
To add further complexity, an avoidance canon straddles the creation and 
interpretation inquiries by discouraging interpretations that approach an uncertain 
limit on creative discretion.37 For example, if a court doubts whether the judiciary 
can create common law contempt rules that govern diversity cases, it might be 
inclined to interpret contempt precedent from federal question cases as not 
extending to diversity cases. This form of avoidance implicates at least two 
constitutional values. First, separation of powers concerns may warrant eschewing 
interpretations that could extend a rulemaker’s power beyond institutional limits. 
Second, federalism concerns may lead courts to reject interpretations of federal law 
that create avoidable conflicts with state law. Accordingly, doubt about whether a 
federal institution can or should create a federal rule that displaces state law may 
favor interpreting the federal rule narrowly.38 
Both the sequential and iterative perspectives on creation and interpretation 
have the same practical effect on prioritization. If a case reaches the prioritization 
stage after the creation and interpretation inquiries are complete, then the court 
knows that a federal law is valid, encompasses the disputed issue, and does not defer 
to state law. 
Accordingly, when courts reach the prioritization inquiry, the creation and 
interpretation inquiries have already done all the interesting work. The only 
remaining question is: Does a valid and nondeferential federal law that encompasses 
a disputed issue have priority over conflicting state law? The Supremacy Clause 
 
36. See infra Section IV.A. 
37. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001) (considering 
whether a proposed interpretation “arguably” exceeds the rulemaker’s authority). For critiques of 
avoidance, see Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court 
and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (contending that jurisprudence couched in the 
language of restraint often “camouflages acts of judicial aggression”); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, 
Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1067 (2018). 
38. See infra Section IV.B.2.a (discussing potential Erie canons). 
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should make short work of that question because federal priority is usually clear.39 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence overlooks this critical distinction between 
creation and interpretation on the one hand, and prioritization on the other. Parts 
II–IV show that the Court’s blurring of distinct inquiries generates a needlessly 
elaborate prioritization test that distracts from the constitutional and policy 
questions that should animate creation and interpretation. 
II. FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ERIE DOCTRINE’S APPROACH TO 
THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 
The current prioritization inquiry is an example of the mischief that arises 
when courts simultaneously overthink and undertheorize doctrine. Case law 
implements tests that are both intricate and indeterminate, producing answers to 
questions that are not worth asking. Section A suggests reasons for the current 
confusion and links the concepts of prioritization and preemption. Section B 
proposes a new framework that clarifies existing law and isolates its most  
troubling elements. 
A. Sources of Confusion About Prioritization 
Commentators have struggled to identify a foundation for the Supreme 
Court’s prioritization decisions. Several candidates have emerged, including: limits 
on judicial authority arising from the Constitution’s separation of powers, 
federalism norms embedded in the Constitution’s structure, due process, equal 
protection, general choice-of-law principles, the RDA, and intrinsic distinctions 
between substantive and procedural law.40 
At least three pathologies explain the confusion. 
1. Blurring of Erie’s Four Inquiries, Especially Regarding the  
Substance/Procedure Distinction 
Courts and commentators typically bundle all four components of the Erie 
doctrine into a single loosely structured inquiry. Discussions of prioritization 
therefore needlessly invoke concerns that are more relevant to creation, 
interpretation, or adoption.41 Readers confronting these red herring concepts are 
left to struggle with locating where one inquiry ends and another begins. The 
prioritization inquiry’s precise contours thus remain obscure, leading to disputes 
about what the inquiry entails. 
 
39. See infra Section IV.A. 
40. See generally Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008) (rejecting 
several justifications for a broad reading of Erie); Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process 
Challenges: Bond v. United States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987,  
998–1000 (2013); infra Section II.B.4.c. 
41. See infra Section II.B.4 and Part IV. 
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The conflation of four distinct inquiries into an amorphous “Erie doctrine” is 
especially pernicious because some concepts are potentially relevant to all four 
inquiries, but for different reasons. Overlaps between Erie’s components can 
implicate abstract values—such as federalism and separation of powers—or 
seemingly technical questions. 
An example of how Erie’s inquiries can blur involves judicial efforts to 
distinguish substantive rules from procedural rules. The distinction is ethereal 
because “substance” and “procedure” are distracting labels obscuring complex 
concepts. Yet the labels have been inescapable: the Court expressly eschews them,42 
but also repeatedly invokes them.43 Sometimes the same opinion both scorns and 
embraces the substance/procedure distinction. For example, Hanna v. Plumer stated 
that “Erie-type problems” are “not to be solved by reference to any traditional or 
common-sense substance-procedure distinction.”44 This retreat from the 
substance/procedure distinction lasted only a few paragraphs. Hanna eventually 
observed that Erie “say[s], roughly, that federal courts are to apply state ‘substantive’ 
law and federal ‘procedural’ law.”45 Similarly, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York stated that 
“the question is not whether a [state rule] is deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some 
sense.”46 But the following sentence considered whether the state rule was a “matter 
of substance.”47 Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 
neatly illustrates the substance/procedure distinction’s stubborn persistence.  
He acknowledged that “in many situations procedure and substance are so 
interwoven that rational separation becomes well-nigh impossible.”48 But in the 
next sentence, he stated that “this fact cannot dispense with the necessity of making 
a distinction.”49 
The substance/procedure distinction’s ubiquity is disorienting because the line 
between substance and procedure has different contours and significance in 
different contexts. In the creation inquiry, the substance/procedure distinction 
influences the validity of federal law, including federal statutes governing litigation,50 
 
42. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) (holding that 
characterizing a state rule as “procedural” does not fully capture the rule’s “effect[s]” and therefore 
does not determine its applicability in federal court). 
43. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Classification of 
a law as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor.”);  
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (characterizing forum non conveniens as a rule 
“of procedure rather than substance”); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (stating that 
Erie’s “concerns” are “at issue” “[o]nly when there is conflict between state and federal  
substantive law”). 
44. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465–66. 
45. Id. at 471. 
46. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
47. Id. York’s author later referred to the substance/procedure distinction as “less than  
self-defining” and “delusive.” Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 207 (1956) (Frankfurter,  
J., concurring). 
48. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 83–87. 
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rules promulgated under the REA,51 and perhaps some forms of federal common 
law arising from the judiciary’s inherent powers under Article III.52 In the 
interpretation inquiry, the substance/procedure distinction could influence how 
broadly or narrowly courts read rules.53 In the prioritization inquiry, the  
substance/procedure distinction arguably animates the current “unguided” 
approach to vertical conflicts between state law and federal common law.54 And in 
the adoption inquiry, the substance/procedure distinction influences state  
choice-of-law rules that apply under Klaxon.55 Implementing the  
substance/procedure distinction sensibly—to the extent that doing so is possible 
or desirable—requires a precise understanding of why the distinction matters. 
Precision is elusive when all four Erie inquiries blur together. 
The Supreme Court inadvertently illustrated its own confusion when it 
discussed the substance/procedure distinction in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.56 
Consider two adjacent sentences from the opinion. First: 
Except at the extremes, the terms “substance” and “procedure” precisely 
describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular 
context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy  
is drawn.57 
Second: 
In the context of our Erie jurisprudence . . . that purpose is to establish 
(within the limits of applicable federal law, including the prescribed Rules 
of Federal Procedure) substantial uniformity of predictable outcome 
between cases tried in a federal court and cases tried in the courts of the 
State in which the federal court sits.58 
 
51. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure . . . .”). 
52. See Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on 
the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1184 (2006) (“Given that Congress [in the 
REA] reserved to itself the exclusive right to create procedural law that encroaches on substantive 
rights, it would be very odd indeed if the Court could evade this restriction simply by relying on its 
inherent power.”). But see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504, 508 (2001) 
(holding that preclusion is an appropriate subject for federal common law even though it might be 
substantive in the REA context). For a discussion of federal procedural common law’s foundation and 
scope, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008). For a similar 
discussion in the context of federal equitable remedies, see Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical 
Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010); Michael 
T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217 (2018); citations infra note 157. 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 407–08. 
54. See infra Section II.B.4.b. 
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A 
court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even when it 
applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”). 
56. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). 
57. Id. at 726–27. 
58. Id. at 727. 
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The first sentence cautions courts to think carefully about why they are drawing a 
line between substance and procedure. The second sentence fails to exercise that 
caution. The Court refers to “our Erie jurisprudence” as if “Erie” is a single 
monolithic inquiry. But Erie is an amalgam of four distinct inquiries that invoke the 
substance/procedure distinction for different reasons. The Court was thus unable 
to precisely articulate distinctions between Erie’s components in a decision that is 
about the importance of precisely articulating doctrine. 
This Article’s analysis does not depend on any particular view of whether the 
substance/procedure distinction is useful. Indeed, the distinction’s utility varies by 
context and therefore resists general conclusions. For present purposes, the 
distinction is interesting only because it highlights the importance of carefully 
focusing on the unique purposes and constraints of each of Erie’s four components. 
An added virtue of the Article’s framework is that it renders the often confusing  
substance/procedure distinction irrelevant to the prioritization inquiry.59 
2. Fragmented Doctrinal Evolution Across Contexts and over Time 
A second reason why the prioritization inquiry has become needlessly 
complicated is that it currently operates differently depending on the source and 
content of federal law.60 Yet the case-by-case process of adjudication generally 
prevents courts from comprehensively articulating these differences. Courts address 
the specific problem that a case presents. This leads to decisions about individual 
trees that only briefly sketch the surrounding forest. Absent a comprehensive 
account, the prioritization inquiry can seem malleable and arbitrary. 
A related complication is that the prioritization inquiry has evolved over time. 
Yet the Supreme Court’s reluctance to overrule prior decisions means that old and 
new precedents coexist. Readers cannot be certain about whether a new decision 
displaces older decisions. As time passes, doctrine becomes an accretion of 
discordant layers. 
For example, in 1958 the Court extensively discussed prioritization in Byrd  
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative.61 The Court then essentially ignored Byrd for 
the next thirty-eight years, citing its prioritization inquiry only rarely and 
tangentially.62 Some commentators believed that Byrd’s unique methodology had 
 
59. See infra Section IV.A. 
60. See infra Section II.B. 
61. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
62. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping, Inc., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam) (citing Byrd only 
for its holding); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965) (considering problem that was 
conceptually similar to what Byrd considered, but citing Byrd only for its recharacterization of a prior 
precedent); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963) (“cf.” citation to Byrd); Magenau v. Aetna Freight 
Lines, 360 U.S. 273, 278 (1959) (addressing facts similar to Byrd’s). 
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faded into irrelevance.63 Yet Byrd prominently reappeared in a 1996 decision64 
before mostly disappearing in a major 2010 decision.65 Byrd’s current force is 
unclear. Like a dormant volcano, Byrd occasionally emits puffs of unsettling smoke. 
Arguably, Byrd should have more prominence than the Court currently accords it if 
one thinks carefully about how Byrd coexists with Hanna.66 
3. Failure to Reconcile Erie with Preemption Jurisprudence 
Finally, the prioritization inquiry should be—but currently is  
not—indistinguishable from preemption analysis. Asking whether a federal rule has 
priority over a conflicting state rule is equivalent to asking whether the federal rule 
preempts the state rule. 
The analogy to preemption may seem jarring because federal law typically 
preempts state law in either all U.S. courts or no U.S. courts.67 Yet I am arguing that 
sometimes federal law preempts state law in federal courts but not in state courts.68 
The incongruity fades when one recognizes the interplay between prioritization and 
interpretation. A federal court can interpret a federal law narrowly so that its scope 
encompasses cases in federal court but not in state court. For example, consider the 
contempt hypothetical from Part I. A federal court might decide that federal law 
governs lawyers’ misconduct in federal courts adjudicating state claims but is silent 
about misconduct in state courts adjudicating federal claims.69 Giving this 
interpretation a preemptive effect would displace state law only in federal court, 
leaving state courts free to develop their own rules.70 Likewise, in some 
circumstances a federal rule might preempt state law in only a subset of cases in 
federal court; for example, in federal question cases but not diversity cases.71 And 
 
63. See Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76  
TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (1998) (noting “confusion” among commentators about Byrd’s status). 
64. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431–38 (1996); cf. Adam  
N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial 
Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 267–69 (2008) (noting uncertainty about how Gaspirini 
situated Byrd in the Erie pantheon). 
65. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Byrd only briefly in a concurring opinion). 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 189–92. 
67. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (obligating “the judges in every state” to follow federal law that 
conflicts with otherwise applicable state law). 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13. 
69. See supra Section I.A; see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 450 (1994) (holding 
that federal forum non conveniens doctrine applies in federal court but not in state court); Jeffrey  
L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with Two Stones, 90 IND. L.J. 1591, 1615–16 (2015) 
(discussing “partial preemption”). 
70. See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411, 464 
(2018) (noting that state procedures provide an important alternative to federal procedures for 
enforcing protected rights). 
71. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n.2 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created 
by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations . . . . In a federal-court suit 
on a state-created right, however, a plaintiff must serve process before the statute of limitations has 
run, if state law so requires for a similar state-court suit.”). 
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in unusual situations a federal rule that applies only in federal court may justify an 
ancillary federal rule that protects federal policy interests by preempting state law in 
state courts. An interesting example comes from FRCP 23, which governs class 
actions in federal courts but also generates federal common law that applies in state 
courts. A federal common law tolling rule protects the policies underlying Rule 23 
by preventing state courts from dismissing claims as untimely based on delays 
caused by prior Rule 23 litigation.72 
Accordingly, this Article’s references to preemption assume that federal law 
displaces state law only on matters within a particular federal law’s scope. Federal 
law therefore will sometimes apply only to certain kinds of claims (e.g., federal 
question claims rather than diversity claims) or only in certain kinds of courts  
(e.g., federal courts rather than state courts). 
Despite preemption’s relevance, the Supreme Court generally treats its Erie 
and preemption cases as distinct lines of authority. Opinions considering whether a 
federal statute displaces state law in a diversity case often invoke Erie without 
mentioning preemption,73 or invoke preemption without mentioning Erie.74 A 
handful of opinions mention both Erie and preemption without acknowledging that 
the two doctrines address the same issue from different directions.75 
 
72. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Class Actions, Statutes of Limitations 
and Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Burbank & Wolff, 
Common Law] (discussing this example in detail). More generally, Burbank and Wolff have contended 
that federal law’s ability to displace state law is in part a function of the federal law’s source, which 
influences the breadth of a court’s interpretive discretion. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25–26 (2010) 
[hereinafter Burbank & Wolff, Missed Opportunities]. 
73. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967) (holding 
without reference to preemption or the Supremacy Clause that Erie permits federal courts “to apply 
rules enacted by Congress with respect to matters . . . over which it has legislative power”); Stewart  
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (citing Prima); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (holding that Erie should not be “extended to legal problems affecting  
international relations”). 
74. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (discussing preemption in a diversity 
action without citing Erie); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 (1995) (same); Boyle  
v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (same); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 
45 (1987) (same); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (same). 
75. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990) (citing both Erie and preemption); 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 414 n.13 (2010) (plurality 
opinion) (same); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 198 (1988) (citing the Supremacy 
Clause and noting that Erie did not require applying state law); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 
389 (1974) (noting that “under the regime of Erie,” federal courts must enforce state policy choices 
when there is “no overriding federal rule which pre-empts state law”); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 67 (1966) (holding that Erie does not override a “pre-empting federal interest” in a 
diversity case); Transcon. & W. Air v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 656–57 (1953) (citing Erie while 
considering whether federal law preempted plaintiff’s state law claim in a diversity action); Francis  
v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (holding that “the Supremacy Clause” leaves “no room for the 
application of Erie”); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (citing the 
Supremacy Clause as supporting proposition that “the doctrine of [Erie] is inapplicable to those areas 
of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes 
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those 
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Scholarship about preemption generally does not discuss Erie, while 
scholarship about Erie tends not to discuss preemption.76 This 
compartmentalization has led scholars to overlook the point that I address in Parts 
III and IV: because preemption analysis subsumes prioritization analysis, and 
because federal common law is often preemptive, Erie’s interpretation and creation 
components should do most of the work currently allocated to the prioritization 
component. The interesting question is not whether valid federal common law 
encompassing an issue has priority over state law. Priority usually is automatic. 
Instead, the interesting questions are whether federal common law can and does 
encompass a disputed issue. 
B. Current Applications of Erie’s Prioritization Inquiry 
This Section outlines a framework for understanding the Supreme Court’s 
prioritization jurisprudence. The framework provides a rationale and organization 
that are consistent with the Court’s decisions but not always evident in the  
decisions themselves.77 
The Article’s framework identifies four distinct rules that emerge from the 
Supreme Court’s post-Erie decisions. The first three rules address the Constitution, 
statutes, regulations, formal rules (such as the FRCP), and treaties. These aspects of 
prioritization jurisprudence are not controversial. Indeed, treating them as distinct 
helps reveal why they are unobjectionable. The fourth prioritization rule addresses 
federal common law and is highly contestable. Isolating this approach to federal 
common law and unpacking its assumptions can help courts clarify their analysis 
and focus on where modern doctrine goes astray. Part III builds on this foundation 
to expose flaws in the Court’s prioritization jurisprudence. 
 
statutes”); cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476–77 (1979) (holding that despite Erie, federal rather 
than state law supplied standards for implementing a federal statute); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 
174 (1949) (same); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200–01 (1940) (same); Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson 
Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1939) (holding that Erie did not require applying state law 
to determine “remedial details” when a right stemmed from a treaty). 
76. See Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (2016). Suzanna Sherry 
has identified this and other discontinuities as an example of unwarranted “exceptionalism” about Erie. 
Id. My prior work likewise highlights how Erie’s mystique obscures its foundations and implications. 
See Erbsen, supra note 9, at 582–83. For examples of scholarship linking Erie and preemption for various 
purposes, see Burbank & Wolff, Missed Opportunities, supra note 72, at 39 (noting that concerns about 
preemption influence interpretation of the FRCP); Clermont, supra note 11, at 9 (stating that Erie’s 
“ballyhooed” prioritization component often overshadows preemption analysis); Wendy Collins 
Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 
46 U. KAN. L. REV. 751, 774 (1998) (“Erie cases are simply a small subset of preemption and federal 
common law cases, and they can be analyzed as such”); Rensberger, supra note 69, at 1620 (noting 
overlapping “areas of inquiry” between Erie cases and preemption cases); Peter Westen & Jeffrey  
S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (1980) 
(recognizing that a “valid and pertinent” federal law should displace state law). 
77. See supra notes 73–75 (noting that the Court often treats its Erie and preemption decisions 
as separate lines of precedent). 
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1. The Constitution Has Priority over State Law 
The prioritization inquiry is simple when the Constitution conflicts with state 
law. The Constitution always has priority. 
The Constitution itself supplies the priority rule in Article VI, which states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.78 
The Supremacy Clause does not contain any caveats, so there is no need to 
categorize constitutional provisions as substantive or procedural. If a constitutional 
provision applies—i.e., if the interpretation inquiry reveals that the disputed issue is 
within the provision’s scope—then it supersedes all other potentially applicable law. 
The Court has acknowledged that Erie did not alter the Supremacy Clause’s 
sweeping approach to the Constitution’s preemptive force.79 
Of course, displacing state law implicates Erie’s concerns about respecting 
state “autonomy.”80 Courts in close cases might therefore seek to avoid 
displacement by concluding that the Constitution does not apply. These situations 
do not implicate the Constitution’s supremacy. Instead, they implicate its scope. 
Judges who decline to apply an ostensibly relevant constitutional provision 
implement Erie’s interpretation component rather than its  
prioritization component. 
2. Federal Statutes and Treaties Have Priority over State Law 
The Supremacy Clause adopts the same priority rule for statutes and treaties 
as for the Constitution: all three are “supreme.”81 Accordingly, statutes and treaties 
have priority over state law regardless of whether they are substantive or procedural. 
Confusion nevertheless arises because discussions of statutes and treaties 
often blur the creation, interpretation, and prioritization inquiries. Separating these 
inquiries clarifies the role of each. 
The substance/procedure distinction is often relevant when applying the 
creation inquiry to statutes. In various circumstances, Congress has authority to 
 
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
79. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam) (holding that Erie does not 
preclude invoking the Seventh Amendment rather than state law in a diversity case to determine 
whether an action is legal or equitable); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949) 
(“a federal court would not give effect, in either a diversity or nondiversity case, to a state statute that 
violates the Constitution”); cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 303 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(noting that Erie’s preservation of state regulatory autonomy does not insulate states from federal 
constitutional constraints). 
80. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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create only laws that are “rationally capable of classification” as procedural.82 Article 
I allows Congress to enact “all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry 
into Execution . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States.”83 One of the “Powers” that Congress can support is the “judicial 
Power” in Article III.84 Similarly, Articles I and III allow Congress to “constitute” 
and “establish” lower federal courts.85 According to the Supreme Court, this power 
includes authority “to prescribe and regulate the modes of proceeding in such 
courts.”86 These clauses do not provide a back door to new substantive powers. For 
example, a statute regulating purely intrastate commerce could not circumvent the 
Interstate Commerce Clause merely because the statute also provides procedures 
for enforcing the new federal regulations in a federal court. Similar bootstrapping 
concerns could arise under the Treaty Clause if treaties implement nominally 
procedural goals using methods that undermine substantive state interests.87 
In both the statute and treaty contexts, Erie’s creation inquiry polices 
compliance with limits on federal authority. The relevant question is whether  
quasi-substantive federal laws are valid. This question precedes consideration of 
their priority. 
Efforts to characterize statutes as substantive or procedural may also affect 
interpretation. As discussed in Part IV, courts might use various canons to interpret 
 
82. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“Rules regulating matters indisputably 
procedural are a priori constitutional. Rules regulating matters ‘which, though falling within the 
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either,’ also 
satisfy this constitutional standard.” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965))). Congress 
can also regulate procedure in state courts as a necessary and proper incident to its substantive powers, 
although arguably cannot control state procedure in cases implicating only state law. See Jinks  
v. Richland Cty., 538 U.S. 456, 464–65 (2003) (acknowledging a party’s concerns about federal 
interference with state court procedures, sustaining a challenged federal statute despite these concerns, 
but noting that “we need not (and do not) hold that Congress has unlimited power to regulate practice 
and procedure in state courts”); Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 
YALE L.J. 947 (2001) (contending that in state courts, state law provides procedures for adjudicating 
state law claims even though federal law can provide procedures for federal claims). Federal common 
law may also apply in state courts when nominally procedural decisions would implicate federal 
substantive interests. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 810–17 (1986) (considering 
when federal common law preclusion rules displace state preclusion rules in state courts). Federal courts 
also indirectly influence the development of state law when attempting to predict its content while 
implementing Erie’s adoption inquiry. See Laura E. Little, Erie’s Unintended Consequence: Federal Courts 
Creating State Law, 52 AKRON L. REV. 275 (2019). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
84. Id. art. III, § 1; see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825) (holding that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause’s application to Article III “seems to be one of those plain 
propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer”). 
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. III, § 2. 
86. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835). But see David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic 
Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 104–19 (contending 
that the Tribunals Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate judicial procedures). 
87. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; cf. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014) (raising 
but avoiding question about how the Treaty Clause augments federal regulatory authority). 
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statutes broadly or narrowly depending on their subject matter, including their 
substantive or procedural character. 
Although the creation and interpretation inquiries for statutes are complicated, 
the priority inquiry is simple. All valid federal statutes preempt inconsistent state 
law on matters within a federal statute’s scope. Determining whether a statute is 
valid and what it means is difficult. When we know that the statute is valid and 
encompasses an issue, determining its priority is easy. The Court’s occasional 
invocations of Erie in the preemption context acknowledge this basic principle of 
statutory priority.88 
The reference to “inconsistent” state laws in my formulation of the 
preemption/prioritization inquiry is a term of art. The scope of federal preemption 
is not uniform across all statutes. Some statutes preempt only a narrow slice of state 
law that conflicts or interferes with federal law, some preempt a proscribed type of 
state rules, and some preempt an entire field of regulated activity.89 Thus, when I 
say that Erie’s prioritization inquiry is easy because it reduces to a question of 
preemption, the preemption question might still be difficult. But that difficulty 
emerges during Erie’s interpretation inquiry rather than its prioritization inquiry. 
The hard question is determining which kinds of state laws are inconsistent with the 
federal statute and what effect the federal statute should have when disputes 
implicate these inconsistencies. Making these determinations requires using 
conventional tools of statutory interpretation,90 including an interpretive canon 
disfavoring preemption in some circumstances.91 When these interpretive tools 
reveal the federal statute’s scope and rejection of deference to state law, the 
prioritization inquiry is straightforward because all inconsistent state law within the 
federal statute’s scope is preempted. 
The prioritization inquiry for statutes also applies to treaties because the 
Supremacy Clause treats them identically. However, treaties that are not  
self-executing require congressional implementation in order to have a preemptive 
effect.92 Aside from this quirk, treaties and statutes have the same priority. If a 
 
88. See citations supra note 75. 
89. See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (describing “three 
different types of preemption”: “conflict,” “express,” and “field”). 
90. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–43 (2011) (applying traditional interpretive 
methods to determine scope of a statute’s preemption provision); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature 
of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994) (distinguishing the interpretive process of 
identifying preemption from the choice-of-law rule in the Supremacy Clause that allows preemptive 
federal law to displace state law). 
91. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 n.3 (2009). For discussion of the Court’s 
presumption against preemption, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (“courts 
should not automatically seek ‘narrowing’ constructions of federal statutes solely to avoid preemption”), 
and Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013) (“there remain good 
reasons for a presumption against preemption”). 
92. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 694 (2008) (“By declaring treaties to have the 
force of law, the Supremacy Clause makes them enforceable in the courts in the same circumstances as 
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statute or self-executing treaty is valid and encompasses the disputed issue, then it 
preempts inconsistent state law. 
3. Federal Rules and Regulations Promulgated Through a Statutorily Approved Process 
Have Priority over State Law 
This subsection considers how the prioritization inquiry applies to what I call 
“delegated rules,” as distinct from “common law” rules. These labels have no 
intrinsic significance. I use them merely to clarify discussion and track the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. 
A delegated rule is a rule promulgated through a statutorily approved 
rulemaking process. Instead of enacting laws itself, Congress enacts a statute that 
authorizes another institution to regulate. Delegated rules rely on the same 
institutional authority as statutes: Congress’s “legislative Powers” under Article I.93 
In contrast, a common law rule is a rule that arises without a statutory 
delegation of rulemaking authority. These rules rely on Article III’s grant of “judicial 
Power” rather than Article I’s grant of “legislative Power.”94 For example, the rule 
allowing federal district courts to sanction lawyers for pleading frivolous legal 
arguments is a delegated rule because it is within the statutorily authorized Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).95 In contrast, the rule allowing federal district 
courts to sanction parties for bad faith conduct not covered by the FRCP is a 
common law rule that arises from the judiciary’s “inherent power to police itself.”96 
A gray area exists between delegated rules and common law rules when courts 
develop rules in the shadow of statutes. For example, Congress occasionally enacts 
“common law statutes” that provide limited guidance and rely on the judiciary to 
develop the field through adjudication.97 Prominent examples include statutes 
 
statutory and constitutional provisions of like content. . . . The single exception to the requirement of 
equivalent treatment concerns treaties that are non-self-executing . . . .”); cf. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson 
Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1939) (noting that Erie allowed federal common law rather 
than state law to determine “remedial details” of a “right” arising from a treaty). 
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
94. Id.; id. art. III, § 1. 
95. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), 11(c)(1). 
96. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). 
97. Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common Law 
Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
ed., 2013) (contending that the “common law statutes” label implies more cohesiveness and uniqueness 
than may be warranted). Some common law statutes are also examples of what theorists call  
“super-statutes,” which are “applied in accord with a pragmatic methodology that is a hybrid of standard 
precepts of statutory, common law, and constitutional interpretation.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001). 
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governing antitrust,98 labor,99 and intellectual property.100 Less prominent but 
equally interesting is the All Writs Act, which empowers federal courts to “issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable 
to the usages and principles of law.”101 The Court has characterized the All Writs 
Act as “a residual source of authority.”102 This characterization creates ambiguity 
about whether the open-ended statute delegates legislative power or acknowledges 
judicial power. 
Case law applying common law statutes can be characterized in three different 
ways. First, the judiciary might be interpreting the text. Any ensuing law would have 
the status and preemptive force of a statute. Second, the judiciary might be 
exercising delegated power from Congress. Decisions would thus create delegated 
rules through a statutorily authorized adjudicative process. Third, the judiciary 
might be creating common law on its own authority. The ensuing doctrine would 
be analogous to other areas of federal common law with no legislative imprimatur. 
The gray area between common law rules and delegated rules foreshadows a 
doctrinal problem. The Supreme Court prioritizes common law rules differently 
than delegated rules. This distinction is troubling when a rule is amenable to both 
characterizations. Parts III and IV discuss the implications of this gray area in more 
depth and identify other areas where the boundary between delegated and inherent 
power is indeterminate. 
Although the boundary between delegated rules and common law rules can be 
indeterminate, some rules created by the judicial and executive branches clearly rely 
on delegated authority from Congress. Courts therefore must consider whether this 
legislative imprimatur enables delegated rules to have priority over inconsistent  
state law. 
Commentators discussing Erie typically consider only one type of delegated 
rule: the FRCP. But several categories are relevant. First, myriad statutes permit 
federal agencies to promulgate rules using congressionally authorized methods.103 
These rules collectively constitute a body of federal administrative law that often 
conflicts with state law, raising the same kinds of Erie questions that statutes raise.104 
Second, the REA authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate six current sets of 
 
98. See Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (noting that the Sherman 
Act creates a “dynamic” rather than “static” liability standard that incorporates evolving  
“common law”). 
99. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (“We conclude 
that the substantive law to apply in suits under [the Labor Management Relations Act] is federal law, 
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”). 
100. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157,  
172 (2018). 
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018). 
102. Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985). 
103. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–59 (2018). 
104. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874 (2000) (holding that a federal 
regulation preempted state common law). 
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rules governing “practice and procedure” in lower courts: the FRCP, Federal Rules 
of Evidence (FRE), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrimP), Rules 
Governing Section 2254 and Section 2255 Proceedings (Habeas Rules), Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
(FRBP).105 These rules raise prioritization concerns when they conflict with 
otherwise applicable state laws. Even quintessentially federal fields—such as 
bankruptcy and federal criminal law—generate prioritization issues when courts 
employ federal rules while considering state laws entangled with  
federal questions.106 
Delegated rules at first glance have an ambiguous status under the Supremacy 
Clause. The Clause identifies three categories of supreme federal law: “the 
Constitution,” “Treaties,” and all other “Laws of the United States” that are “made 
in pursuance” of the Constitution.107 Delegated rules are not self-evidently “Laws.” 
Congress did not enact them and present them to the President, which is how laws 
are usually made according to the Constitution.108 Commentators have therefore 
questioned the propriety and wisdom of allowing delegated rules to preempt 
otherwise applicable state law.109 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has sensibly held that the “phrase ‘Laws of 
the United States’ encompasses both federal statutes themselves and federal 
regulations that are properly adopted in accordance with statutory authorization.”110 
Whether the delegated rule is a “Law” is an interesting question that is irrelevant for 
prioritization purposes. What matters is that the statute authorizing the rule is a 
Law. The statutory pedigree enables the rule to ride the statute’s coattails into a 
supreme position in the constitutional hierarchy. A similar coattails phenomenon 
occurs within the Executive Branch because the Constitution vests “executive 
Power” only in the President.111 Yet the President can assign executive functions to 
subordinate officers whose actions then have a presidential imprimatur.112 Thus, 
 
105. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 2075 (2018). The REA is not the sole source of authority for federal 
procedural rules. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g) (2018) (authorizing rulemaking by foreign  
intelligence courts). 
106. See citations supra note 13. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
108. See id. art. I, § 7. 
109. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38  
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 334 (2015) (“[I]f agency action qualifies as ‘supreme Law,’ then it violates 
the Constitution’s separation of powers. Meanwhile, if agency action does not qualify as ‘Law’ (thus 
saving it from separation of powers doom), then it falls beyond the Supremacy Clause’s purview. In 
short, to qualify for preemption, agency action must simultaneously qualify as Law for federalism 
purposes and not Law for separation of powers.”); citations infra note 153 (discussing application of the 
Supremacy Clause to federal common law). 
110. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988). But cf. Lipschultz v. Charter Advanced 
Servs., 140 S. Ct. 6, 7 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“It is doubtful whether 
a federal policy—let alone a policy of nonregulation—is ‘Law’ for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.”). 
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
112. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and in the judgment) (“Surely the authority granted to members of the Cabinet and federal law 
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both the legislative power vested in Congress and the executive power vested in the 
President can be exercised by other institutions and officers through delegation. 
Rules promulgated through statutory delegation are manifestations of legislative 
power. Likewise, actions taken by properly deputized and supervised officers are 
manifestations of executive power. 
Accordingly, as the Court has held, federal “regulations have no less  
pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.”113 Regulations can supersede state law 
even if the authorizing statute is silent about preemption, so long as the “federal 
agency has properly exercised its own delegated authority.”114 
As with regulations, the Court has held that valid delegated rules adopted 
under the REA displace inconsistent state law.115 In both the agency and REA 
contexts, the rulemaker derives its preemptive authority from Congress.116 Of 
course, regulations promulgated by agencies and rules promulgated by courts 
generally address different kinds of issues. But the Supremacy Clause is  
content-neutral. All valid “Laws of the United States” are supreme regardless of 
their subject matter,117 including when they address government “operations” (such 
as judicial procedure).118 
The REA includes a supersession clause that appears to make preemption 
express rather than implied,119 although there is an argument that the clause is 
 
enforcement agents is properly characterized as ‘Executive’ even though not exercised by the 
President.”). Interesting questions about the nature of executive power arise when Congress, rather 
than the President, vests discretion in officials who the President cannot control. See Gillian E. Metzger, 
The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1880 (2015) (considering whether Presidential 
control over decisionmaking is a necessary element of Article II’s framework for supervision of 
executive action). 
113. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
114. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64; see also Fid. Fed., 458 U.S. at 154 (“A pre-emptive 
regulation’s force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law . . . . 
Rather, the questions upon which resolution of this case rests are whether the [agency] meant to  
pre-empt California’s due-on-sale law, and, if so, whether that action is within the scope of the [agency’s] 
delegated authority.”). 
115. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (holding that a rule’s “validity” establishes 
its “applicability” in lieu of conflicting state law). The Court has also endorsed Congress’s “power to 
delegate rulemaking authority to the Judicial Branch” through the REA. Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 388 (1989). 
116. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941) (holding that a valid FRCP provision 
“has the force of a federal statute”). 
117. In contrast, horizontal choice-of-law inquiries are more complicated because the Full Faith 
and Credit and Due Process Clauses do not contain a bright line priority rule. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
118. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819) (holding that the Supremacy 
Clause applies to statutes addressing the “operations” of federal institutions). 
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). A statute cannot supersede the Constitution, so the REA 
presumably excludes the Constitution from its definition of “laws” that rules supersede. Id. FRCP 82 
disclaims authority to extend jurisdiction, which avoids the question of whether the supersession clause 
would allow a rule to supplant jurisdictional statutes. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10 (raising this question). 
Congress repealed the supersession clause that applied to bankruptcy rules, which are promulgated 
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narrower than its text suggests. The supersession clause states that: “All laws in 
conflict with [national rules promulgated under the REA] shall be of no further 
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”120 The plain meaning of “all laws” 
encompasses both federal and state laws. But if this plain reading is correct, then 
state laws that conflict with federal rules would have no “force or effect” even in 
state court, which Congress presumably did not intend.121 The phrase “all laws” 
therefore might mean “all federal laws,” such that the supersession clause preempts 
federal law but not state law. However, an alternative way to resolve the clause’s 
ambiguity would be to interpret “no further force or effect” to mean “no further 
force or effect in federal court.” This interpretation would treat the supersession 
clause as preempting “all laws”—including state laws—in federal court, but not in 
state court. Accordingly, the clause is amenable to two conflicting interpretations, 
both of which require adding an implied limit to the ostensibly plain text. Both 
interpretations are arguably consistent with aspects of the clause’s two original 
purposes, which were to: (1) address separation of powers concerns by delineating 
judicial and legislative authority to make binding rules; and (2) “free the federal 
courts from the obligation to apply state law imposed by the Conformity Act of 
1872.”122 This Article expresses no view about which interpretation of the 
supersession clause is correct. In practice, REA-derived rules preempt state law in 
federal court even without resort to the supersession clause.123 
The fact that valid delegated rules preempt state law on matters within their 
scope does not mean that validity and scope are easy to determine. But as noted in 
prior sections, questions about validity and scope implicate Erie’s creation and 
interpretation inquiries rather than its prioritization inquiry. 
A large literature addresses how the creation and interpretation inquiries apply 
to administrative regulations implicating federalism and separation of powers 
concerns. Relevant questions include whether Congress can and should delegate a 
particular power,124 how much deference agencies should receive when interpreting 
a statutory delegation,125 and if courts should put a thumb on the interpretive scale 
either for or against preemption.126 The priority inquiry is simple when the answers 
to these questions reveal that a regulation implements a valid delegation and 
 
under § 2075 rather than § 2072. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92  
Stat. 2549, 2672 (1978). 
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
121. See Roosevelt, supra note 33, at 39. 
122. Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance” and 
“Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1044 n.203 (1989). 
123. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965). 
124. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME  
L. REV. 1541 (2008). 
125. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008); Nina  
A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
126. See citations supra note 92. 
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encompasses a disputed issue despite the existence of conflicting state law. The 
Supremacy Clause enforces preemption. 
The creation and interpretation inquiries under the REA are also vexing and 
have caused confusion. The substance/procedure distinction emerges again 
because the REA precludes rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”127 Assessing a rule’s validity therefore requires considering whether it is 
excessively substantive.128 
Even when rules are valid, the Court has suggested that federalism concerns 
warrant interpreting federal rules narrowly to avoid conflict with state law.129 But 
the Court has also said the opposite by purporting to apply the FRCP’s “plain 
meaning” despite the existence of inconsistent state law.130 Under either interpretive 
approach, when a valid federal rule unavoidably conflicts with state law, the federal 
rule has priority.131 
Unilateral executive actions present a complication when considering the 
priority of delegated rules. The Supreme Court has held that executive orders and 
agreements have preemptive force under the Supremacy Clause.132 These executive 
decisions do not rely on legislative delegation. Preemption without legislative action 
 
127. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b), 2075 (2018). 
128. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (“Rules which incidentally affect 
litigants’ substantive rights do not violate [the REA] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of 
[the REA-authorized] system of rules.”). 
129. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996) (characterizing 
precedent as interpreting the FRCP “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies”). For similar reasoning applied to federal statutes rather than the FRCP, see Bernhardt  
v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act “narrowly” to 
avoid deciding whether Erie authorized creation of a federal rule and preemption of state law); Stewart 
Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing precedent as 
“avoid[ing]” “broad” interpretations of federal law that would create “disuniformity between state and 
federal courts”). For a critique of the Court’s avoidance decisions under the REA, see Genetin, supra 
note 37. 
130. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980). For a discussion of how 
federalism concerns should influence interpretation of the FRCP, see Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16  
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 239–59 (2013) (recommending substantive canons to restrain the 
FRCP’s scope); Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307, 310 (2014) (noting that 
concerns about federalism are often in tension with other normative commitments in civil procedure 
cases, including concerns about protecting party interests). Separation of powers concerns should also 
inform interpretation by conforming a rule’s scope to the REA’s admonition against modifying 
substantive rights. See Burbank & Wolff, Missed Opportunities, supra note 72, at 44 (criticizing the 
“federalism myth” underlying REA jurisprudence). 
131. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). 
132. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“valid executive agreements 
are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are”); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418  
U.S. 264, 273 (1974) (holding that an executive order can preempt state law). In contrast to the President 
acting without Congress, Congress acting without the President—absent a veto override—probably 
cannot enact preemptive law. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (holding that congressional 
decisions of “legislative character” require presentment to the President). 
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raises idiosyncratic federalism and separation of powers issues.133 However, for 
prioritization purposes, these executive decisions currently have the same 
preemptive force as statutes and delegated rules. If they are valid and encompass a 
disputed issue, and if the Court is correct about their status under the Supremacy 
Clause, then they have priority over state law without need for any further inquiry. 
In sum, the prioritization inquiry for delegated rules (and possibly unilateral 
executive actions) is straightforward. If the creation and interpretation inquiries 
warrant applying the federal delegated rule, then the federal delegated rule has 
priority under the Supremacy Clause. 
4. The Priority of Federal Common Law Currently Depends on  
Several Loosely Related Standards 
This Section addresses the prioritization inquiry’s most muddled component. 
To frame the problem, recall how we arrived at this point. The question we are 
trying to answer is: How does the Supreme Court decide when a valid federal law 
that encompasses a disputed issue displaces inconsistent state law? The 
prioritization inquiry is simple for four types of federal law: the Constitution, 
statutes, self-executing treaties, and delegated rules, including agency regulations 
and rules promulgated under the REA. These all have priority under the Supremacy 
Clause even though the Court often does not invoke supremacy when discussing 
Erie.134 The only remaining category of federal law to consider is federal common 
law (FCL). 
a. Reasons Why the Prioritization Inquiry Is Difficult in Cases Involving  
Federal Common Law 
Determining FCL’s priority over conflicting state law is difficult for at least 
three reasons. FCL encompasses several distinct subfields that are not fully defined, 
has an uncertain status under the Supremacy Clause, and raises conceptual questions 
that its fragmentation into subfields obscures. 
First, FCL is not a uniform body of law. Different categories of FCL serve 
different purposes, arise from different sources, and implicate different 
constitutional values. Dividing FCL into categories is useful when the relevant 
question is how a particular category should operate. For example, courts might 
want to know a particular category’s source, role, contours, and limits. However, in 
the context of prioritization, the fact that FCL comes in many flavors obscures 
common features relevant to preemption. 
 
133. For a critique of giving preemptive force to Presidential decisions without approval from 
Congress, see Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
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Commentators do not agree on the basic definition of FCL and have 
constructed several competing taxonomies for its branches.135 For present 
purposes, the outline of an ideal taxonomy is less important than the taxonomy’s 
complexity. What matters is that FCL encompasses many diverse species,  
including law: 
• governing enclaves in which the Constitution expressly or 
implicitly preempts state law, such as admiralty,136 foreign 
relations,137 interstate relations,138 and tribal relations;139 
• implementing terms in the Constitution that incorporate common 
law concepts;140 
• protecting the federal government’s “proprietary” interests in 
commercial transactions and government operations,141 including 
judicial operations;142 
• regulating procedures in federal court pursuant to “inherent 
power”143 or other sources of authority;144 
 
135. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100  
NW. U. L. REV. 585, 590–94 (2006) (canvassing multiple definitions of “federal common law” and 
noting the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition in light of the topic’s breadth and complexity); 
cf. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (identifying “essentially two 
categories” of FCL: exercising delegated power from Congress and protecting federal interests). 
136. See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004). 
137. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). 
138. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011). 
139. See Oneida Cty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). 
140. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471 n.9 (1942) ( Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution uses words and phrases borrowed from the common law, meaningless 
without that background, and obviously meant to carry their common law implications.”). For 
discussion of whether the Constitution’s incorporation of common law is dynamic or static, see Allan 
Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1243–44 n.283 (2011) (analyzing definition of 
the “high Seas”). 
141. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973). 
142. See Burbank & Wolff, Common Law, supra note 72 (discussing an FCL tolling rule that 
applies in state courts in order to protect federal policy interests underlying FRCP 23); cf. 28  
U.S.C. § 1651 (2018) (authorizing federal courts to issue injunctions “in aid of their  
respective jurisdictions”). 
143. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). 
144. For example, federal abstention doctrines are a form of procedural common law that 
arguably implement either inherent power, constitutional federalism and separation of powers 
principles, or discretion implicit in jurisdictional statutes. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation 
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 84 (1984) (contending that the 
Supreme Court has not afforded abstention doctrines the “cautious scrutiny” that “federal common 
law” typically entails); see also infra Section III.A (discussing FCL arising from the Any Manner clauses). 
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• creating and refining remedies, such as the Bivens action,145 class 
actions,146 and doctrines borrowed from equity;147 
• arising from international customs (maybe);148 
• implementing statutory delegations of lawmaking authority to the 
judiciary;149 
• filling gaps in statutes;150 and 
• filling gaps in the Constitution, including by defining how 
government institutions operate,151 which animates aspects of the 
Erie doctrine itself.152 
Accordingly, the Erie doctrine’s application to FCL creates a perfect storm of 
confusion. FCL’s structure is amorphous, its legitimacy is contested, and doctrine 
that attempts to provide structure and legitimacy is itself a form of unstructured and 
contested FCL. 
Second, FCL presents idiosyncratic prioritization problems when it does not 
fit neatly into the Supremacy Clause’s hierarchy. Most types of FCL listed above 
trace their lineage to supreme federal law. They either: (1) apply when constitutional 
or statutory displacement of state law leaves a void that only FCL can fill; (2) 
implement constitutional, statutory, or treaty provisions; or (3) arise to some degree 
from a constitutional or statutory delegation of rulemaking power to the judiciary. 
Although many forms of FCL have a solid constitutional or statutory 
foundation, some types of FCL have relatively opaque origins. These FCL rules 
arguably have detailed content that is remote from any plausibly enabling text or 
 
145. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971) (developing federal civil remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment). But see Carlson  
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contending that Erie precludes FCL damages 
remedies for constitutional violations). 
146. See J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165  
U. PA. L. REV. 1625, 1637 (2017) (noting that the Court’s class action jurisprudence includes 
consideration of remedial policies underlying the affected substantive fields). 
147. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945) (holding that federal courts may enforce 
state law using the “traditional body of equitable remedies”). For potential limits on this aspect of FCL, 
see infra text accompanying notes 154–57. 
148. The domestic status of customary international law is contested. For a recent analysis of 
the debate, see Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judicial Branch, 106  
GEO. L. REV. 1707 (2018). 
149. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1963). 
150. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983) (holding that Erie 
does not require “apply[ing] state law in federal interstices”). Canons of interpretation may also be a 
form of FCL. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age 
of Statutes, 5 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013). 
151. See sources cited infra note 397. Judicially enforced norms animating the federal 
government’s operations are a related form of federal common law. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (“doctrines 
and requirements are constitutionally informed but rarely constitutionally mandated”). 
152. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY  
L. REV. 921, 986 (2013) (“[T]he Erie doctrine might best be characterized as what modern lawyers call 
‘federal common law.’”). 
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source of gap-filling authority. Commentators have therefore debated whether 
various FCL rules are “Laws of the United States” entitled to Supremacy.153 For 
example, the Supreme Court recently held that federal courts can enjoin preempted 
state conduct based on “a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, 
tracing back to England.”154 The Court did not identify the constitutional source of 
this equitable power.155 This uncertainty, coupled with the Court’s broad assertion 
of federal remedial authority even in diversity cases,156 raises questions about when 
federal equitable remedies are available to displace state law.157 Similarly, the federal 
status of customary international law is hotly contested in part due to ambiguity 
about its foundation in constitutional or statutory text.158 
Ironically, Erie itself concluded that state common law rules are binding “laws” 
as defined in the RDA.159 But this interpretation of the RDA does not mean that 
 
153. Compare Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79  
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2001) (contending that judge-made rules circumvent Article I’s formal 
lawmaking procedures and therefore cannot be “Laws” under the Supremacy Clause), and Michael  
D. Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 568 (2013) 
(noting that some forms of FCL might not be preemptive, although they could potentially be reframed 
to rely on constitutional or statutory authority), with Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause 
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 742 (2010) (“the word ‘Laws’ in the Supremacy Clause must now 
be taken to include more than Acts of Congress; it must encompass the commands of any authorized 
national lawmaker,” including courts), and Green, supra note 40, at 615–55 (critiquing recent efforts to 
frame Erie as delegitimizing federal common law). The Supreme Court routinely treats FCL as 
preemptive, although Justice Thomas has embraced academic critiques of FCL’s preemptive force. See 
Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1678 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When the Supremacy Clause 
refers to ‘[t]he Laws of the United States made in Pursuance [of the Constitution],’ it means federal 
statutes, not federal common law.”). 
154. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015). 
155. See id. (holding that the Supremacy Clause is not the source of remedial authority). 
156. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945); Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101,  
114 (1915). 
157. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on 
Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1321 (2000) (criticizing the 
“equitable remedial rights doctrine,” which enables federal courts to apply federal equitable remedies 
to claims arising under state law); Morley, supra note 52, at 220–21 (contending that state law should 
govern remedies related to state claims, while federal equitable remedies can enforce federal rights). 
Several theories justify enforcing federal rights with judge-made federal equitable remedies. See, e.g., 
Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1051–52 (2015) 
(discussing justifications for modern federal equity jurisprudence); John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1015 n.103 (2008) (“[T]he Court very likely would regard an equitable remedy that 
protected a legal advantage derived from federal law as itself federal law.”); Ernest A. Young, Our 
Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts 
Law, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 577 (2016) (discussing how federal courts incorporated equity into 
federal law as part of a broader practice of assimilating pre-constitutional law into the constitutional 
order); cf. James E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72  
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing relationship between federal equitable remedies and 
common law writs) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3484165 [https://perma.cc/V84T-
A7UV]). 
158. See supra note 148. 
159. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) (citing what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1652). 
FCL rules are also “laws” under which federal question jurisdiction can arise. See Nat’l Farmers Union 
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federal common law is a form of binding “Laws” under the Supremacy Clause. The 
same word—laws, capitalized or not—can have distinct meanings in different 
instruments. Indeed, some theories of preemption imply that the word “Laws” has 
distinct meanings in one sentence of the same instrument. The Supremacy Clause 
uses the word “Laws” twice: “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance [of the Constitution] . . . shall be . . . supreme . . . any Thing in  
the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”160 The phrase “Laws 
of any State” presumably includes common law. Yet arguments doubting FCL’s 
preemptive force posit that “Laws of the United States” excludes common law. Such 
inconsistent usage of a term is unlikely,161 but is not impossible because inconsistent 
context-sensitive uses of language exist elsewhere in the Constitution.162 
The word “Laws” may also have different meanings over time. As Henry 
Monaghan has noted, the modern “conception of federal common  
law—judge-made law that would bind both federal and state courts—was simply 
not a part of the Founders’ intellectual landscape.”163 The founding generation 
instead accepted the legitimacy of the general law that Erie repudiated.164 
Accordingly, preemption analysis for federal common law under the 
Supremacy Clause is an exercise in translating pre-Erie text to a post-Erie world. 
This exercise leads to frustration: the pre-Erie text is imprecise, the post-Erie world 
is complex, and Erie itself is not a model of clarity. 
Third, case law compounds confusion by not acknowledging that all FCL 
presents the same prioritization question, even if the answer varies by context. 
Recall that the prioritization inquiry asks whether valid federal law has priority over 
state law on matters within the federal law’s scope. That inquiry is potentially 
difficult because various kinds of FCL may or may not trigger the Supremacy 
Clause. So one would expect the Supreme Court to approach prioritization by 
saying, essentially: (1) in this case valid FCL conflicts with state law; so (2) we must 
apply Erie’s prioritization component; which (3) entails determining whether the 
FCL rule is a “Law of the United States” entitled to supremacy; and (4) here is the 
test for making that determination. But this is not the Court’s approach.165 Some 
 
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850 (1985) (“Federal common law as articulated in 
rules that are fashioned by court decisions are ‘laws’ as that term is used in [28 U.S.C.] § 1331.”). 
160. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
161. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1568–69 (2008) 
(contending that FCL is a form of supreme federal law). 
162. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 799 (1999) (“[T]he same 
words sometimes sensibly mean different things in different contexts.”). 
163. Monaghan, supra note 153, at 768. Although the founding generation did not anticipate the 
post-Erie conception of federal common law, the modern distinction between federal common law and 
general law has roots that predate Erie. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (stating 
that “national” common law “incorporated” principles drawn from “general” maritime law and that 
state law was not “valid” if it caused “material prejudice” to these national common law rules). 
164. See Monaghan, supra note 153, at 769–77. 
165. Bradford Clark has suggested that the Court’s bifurcated approach to the priority of FCL 
and federal statutes implicitly implements the Supremacy Clause. See Clark, supra note 153, at 1420–22. 
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decisions addressing FCL’s priority expressly frame the problem in terms of Erie or 
preemption.166 But many decisions never mention preemption, Erie, or its progeny, 
even in diversity cases.167 Treating conceptually similar problems inconsistently is a 
path to an incoherent result. 
b. Reconstructing the Hanna Line of Case Law to Explain How Prioritization Currently 
Addresses Federal Common Law 
A unique prioritization inquiry currently applies to FCL. Hanna established 
that cases “where no Federal Rule applies”—meaning no delegated federal rule, 
such as an FRCP provision—implicate a “relatively unguided Erie choice.”168 
Subsequent decisions confirmed that federal courts will “wade into Erie’s murky 
waters”169 only when “no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute.”170 In 
these cases, the court describes its role as determining whether “federal common 
law” displaces state law.171 
The prioritization inquiry for FCL is difficult to decipher because it has 
developed sporadically. Unlike Congress, the Supreme Court does not draft 
comprehensive codes governing entire fields. Law instead evolves on a case-by-case 
basis to address problems as they arise. Doctrine becomes a pastiche of insights 
from several authors across multiple eras addressing varying contexts. 
A canonical account of prioritization for FCL highlights the Court’s 1965 
decision in Hanna v. Plumer as a transformative moment.172 This account is correct 
 
However, the Court has not expressly endorsed this theory, which relies on contestable skepticism 
about FCL’s preemptive force. See supra note 153 (noting competing interpretations of the  
Supremacy Clause). 
166. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691 (2006) (framing 
FCL’s priority as a “vertical choice-of-law issue” implicating Erie); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90, 100 n.6 (1991) (“the principles recognized in Erie place no limit on a federal court’s power 
to fashion federal common law rules necessary” to enforce “federal law”); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 
U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (contrasting modern restrained approach to federal common law with the  
“free-wheeling days antedating Erie”); Comm’r v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958) (citing Erie to reject 
proposed federal common law rule displacing state law in civil action implicating the U.S. government’s 
rights as a creditor); Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that Erie 
does not bar creation of federal common law rule governing “rights and duties of the United States on 
commercial paper which it issues”). 
167. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004) (applying FCL in a diversity action 
about a maritime contract); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 
U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (applying FCL in a diversity action involving international commerce); Hinderlider 
v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (opinion by Erie’s author on the 
day Erie was decided that does not cite Erie while addressing “a question of ‘federal common law’ upon 
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive”); cf. Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (citing preemption, but not Erie, to justify applying FCL in a 
diversity case). 
168. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965). 
169. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010). 
170. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988). 
171. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001). 
172. See Ely, supra note 8, at 699. 
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only with respect to delegated rules rather than FCL. Hanna protected the REA’s 
aspirations of uniformity by holding that valid delegated rules preempt state law.173 
Hanna thus halted a disturbing trend of decisions that allowed state law to apply in 
circumstances where the FRCP seemed to require a different result.174 The Court in 
Hanna characterized these prior decisions as implicating Erie’s interpretation and 
creation components rather than its priority component because: 
[T]he scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, 
and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in 
dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.175 
When a valid FRCP provision encompassed a disputed issue, Hanna confirmed that 
federal law had priority over inconsistent state law.176 
In contrast to its importance regarding delegated rules, Hanna’s transcendence 
with respect to FCL is a myth. Hanna announced a prioritization approach that 
healed prior infirmities without itself being healthy. Prior and subsequent cases fill 
gaps in Hanna’s basic test, but the enterprise remains unguided. 
I conform to tradition by using Hanna as a label for the lines of precedent that 
it synthesized and the subsequent opinions that it influenced. Like Erie’s role in the 
Erie doctrine, Hanna’s role in the Hanna doctrine is merely one part within a larger 
ensemble. My approach treats Hanna as an inflection point without deifying  
its reasoning. 
This Section does not consider whether particular cases were correctly decided 
or properly reasoned. Instead, I think that the entire journey on which Hanna’s twin 
aims inquiry embarks is misguided and misleading. To be clear, I have no quarrel 
with Hanna’s holding that delegated rules displace inconsistent state law. My 
criticism focuses only on Hanna’s treatment of common law rules. Parts III and IV 
explain my argument. This Section strives only to explain what the Hanna line of 
cases actually does by identifying three propositions that weave their way through 
case law. I do not necessarily agree with these propositions as a normative matter, 
although some could be repurposed as part of the creation and interpretation 
inquires.177 Instead, I present these propositions as a way to describe and 
 
173. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–73. 
174. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (holding that state pre-suit 
indemnification requirement rather than FRCP 23 governed conditions for maintaining an action in 
federal court); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949) (holding that 
state law rather than FRCP 3 governed tolling of the statute of limitations in federal diversity case). 
175. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
176. See id. Hanna’s holding implemented broader themes animating the Warren Court by 
protecting federal “independence from the states.” See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 288 (2000). 
177. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME  
L. REV. 987, 993 (2011) (noting that the federal judiciary’s “choice-of-law power” and “lawmaking 
power” implicate overlapping issues); Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1865 (2013) (defending aspects of Hanna’s test on policy grounds); Westen & Lehman, supra 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
2020] UNIFIED APPROACH 1139 
reconfigure precedent assessing FCL’s priority. This Section also does not try to 
explain how the different propositions fit together because the Court itself has been 
unable to do so. Each proposition is only a waypoint in the  
“unguided” inquiry. 
Proposition 1: Assessing FCL’s priority requires analyzing Erie’s “twin aims,” 
which are “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”178 This policy-oriented framework displaced prior 
emphasis on “uniformity of outcome” between state and federal courts.179 The fact 
that applying federal law may “significantly affect the result” of litigation still 
matters,180 but only to the extent that parties might forum shop to exploit 
differences in law.181 Moreover, forum shopping is not intrinsically disturbing. 
Diversity jurisdiction exists to provide an alternative forum, so by definition it 
promotes forum shopping between state and federal courts.182 Because forum 
shopping is a feature rather than a bug of the federal system, it is troubling only 
when it results in inequity.183 
The fact that only inequitable forum shopping implicates prioritization means 
that Hanna’s “twin” factors reduce to a single concern: illegitimate exploitation of 
federal jurisdiction. The “fortuity”184 of federal jurisdiction should not create a 
“double system of conflicting laws in the same State”185 that enables a party to “gain 
advantages”186 by gaming the system. 
Prominent accounts of Erie incorrectly assume that the “twin aims”  
inquiry—whether understood as having two prongs or collapsing into one—is alone 
sufficient to resolve most priority questions.187 However, the twin aims test merely 
highlights the importance of inequity. The test identifies a goal, not criteria for 
assessing whether the goal has been achieved. If inequity is the touchstone, then 
courts must be able to distinguish equitable from inequitable gamesmanship. 
 
note 76, at 374 (contending that Erie influences the content of FCL rules that potentially conflict with 
state law). 
178. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
179. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958). 
180. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
181. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469; Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429 (1996). 
182. See Ely, supra note 8, at 710; Hart, supra note 13, at 513 (“Why is it an offense to the ideals 
of federalism for federal courts to administer, between citizens of different states, a juster justice than 
state courts, so long as they accept the same premises of underlying, primary obligation and so avoid 
creating uncertainty in the basic rules which govern the great mass of affairs in the ordinary process of 
daily living?”). 
183. Modern concerns about forum shopping may be rooted in received wisdom about 
historical abuses. For a discussion of forum shopping in the era leading to Erie, see EDWARD 
A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL 
AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 177–99 (1992). 
184. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980). 
185. York, 326 U.S. at 112. 
186. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949). 
187. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9, at 717–18; Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our  
Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 518 (2005). 
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Accordingly, extolling Erie’s twin aims cannot alone produce a result without 
considering additional aspects of federal and state law bearing on equity. The two 
propositions below identify potentially relevant factors.188 
Proposition 2: Hanna did not provide a complete account of Erie’s aims. Erie 
also governs the “proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal 
courts.”189 Just as federal courts cannot undermine state interests, state courts 
cannot undermine federal interests. Erie does not require enforcement of state laws 
that “alter the essential character or function of a federal court”190 or “disrupt[ ] the 
federal system.”191 Courts must therefore assess Erie’s “twin aims” in light of federal 
policy interests, which Byrd characterized as “affirmative countervailing 
considerations.”192 Accordingly, Hanna obscured Byrd but did not eclipse it. 
Proposition 3: Although the substance/procedure distinction is hollow and 
not dispositive, characterizations of state and federal law still matter under current 
law. Decisions considering conflicts between FCL and state law routinely lapse into 
euphemisms for substance and procedure. Federal law is more likely to apply if the 
relevant federal rule seems procedural. For example, federal courts apply federal 
rules addressing “details related to” their “conduct of business,”193 “manner and 
means” of enforcing rights,194 and the “scheme for the trial and decision of civil 
cases.”195 In contrast, state law is more likely to apply if it has a “substantive 
thrust.”196 Examples of a substantive thrust include rules that “create[ ] a new 
 
188. An additional deficiency of the twin aims test is that often it is unhelpful for addressing 
priority issues that arise in federal question cases where inequitable forum shopping is not a concern 
(or is less of a concern than in diversity cases). See supra notes 13–14 (noting that priority issues can 
arise in federal question cases); Alexander A. Reinert, Erie Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341,  
2372–83 (2017) (analyzing how prioritization should apply outside the diversity context); cf. Levinson 
v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953) (noting that Erie was “irrelevant” to prioritization in an admiralty 
case because “uniformity in the administration of justice within th[e] State” was not a concern). 
189. York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
190. Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931). Herron predates Erie, but post-Erie cases 
endorsed Herron’s reasoning. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958) 
(citing Herron). 
191. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 437 (1996); see also Alfred Hill, The 
Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 580 (1958) (“some frustration of state 
interests” is “inevitabl[e]” as a “necessary consequence” of “the constitutional power of the federal 
government to regulate the procedure of its own courts”). 
192. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. Identifying and weighing relevant federal interests is a complex 
exercise. See Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the 
Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 384–400 (1977) (discussing potential factors). 
193. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949). 
194. York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
195. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. 
196. Id.; see also Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) (noting that “presumptions” 
and the “burden of proof” are “substantive”); cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 103 n.6 (1971) 
(suggesting that state “housekeeping rules” are unlikely to apply in federal court). 
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liability,”197 make a “right to recover” “unavailable,”198 or are an “integral part” of 
an otherwise applicable state regulation.199 
In sum, FCL’s priority currently depends on balancing a mix of policy 
considerations and characterizations without any guide for calibrating the scale. 
None of these policies and characterizations affect the priority of valid and 
otherwise applicable federal statutes, self-executing treaties, and delegated rules. The 
remainder of this Article explains why the Court’s aberrant treatment of FCL is 
misguided and misleading. 
c. Hanna’s Approach to Priority Cannot Rely on the Rules of Decision Act 
Conventional wisdom about FCL’s priority assumes that the RDA justifies 
Hanna’s framework.200 This conventional account misinterprets the RDA’s text. 
The RDA complements the Supremacy Clause by partially explaining what happens 
when federal law is not available to govern a particular issue. And the RDA may 
have something to say about when federal law is available.201 However, the RDA 
does not create a choice-of-law rule in cases where valid federal common law 
encompassing a disputed issue conflicts with otherwise applicable state law. 
The RDA provides that: 
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.202 
 
197. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 555. 
198. York, 326 U.S. at 109; see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947) (holding that a 
federal court “cannot give that which [the state] has withheld”); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 
U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (“a right which local law creates but which it does not supply with a remedy is no 
right at all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court”). 
199. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535–36 (1958) (holding that Erie “required” “respect[ing] the definition 
of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts” by enforcing state laws “bound up with the 
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties”); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 
337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949) (holding that state law supplies the “measure” of the rights it creates). 
200. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1941) (characterizing the RDA as a 
choice-of-law rule that applies to “substantive law” rather than “rules of procedure”); Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If no 
federal rule applies, a federal court must follow the Rules of Decision Act . . . to determine whether the 
state law is the ‘rule of decision.’”); id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the RDA “directs” 
the test in Hanna); Ely, supra note 8, at 717; Freer, supra note 63, at 1637 (describing “the RDA prong 
of the Erie Doctrine”); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Years: Erie Railroad Company  
v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 675 n.32 (1988) (discussing the 
“substantive preserve guaranteed the states under the Rules of Decision Act”). 
201. See Burbank, supra note 82, at 789 (noting that the RDA “impos[es] discipline” on FCL by 
suggesting that FCL is available only when the Constitution, treaties, or statutes require or provide for 
FCL, such that federal courts cannot simply “conjure up” federal “interests”); id. at 761 n.121 
(expressing skepticism about “techniques to avoid confronting the Rules of Decision Act”). 
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018). 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
1142 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1101 
The RDA’s opaque text at first glance seems to justify Hanna. The strongest form 
of the argument has four steps: 
(1) A cognizable category of state law fits within the label “rules of 
decision” and is distinct from state laws that are not rules of 
decision. 
(2) The line between “rules of decision” and “not rules of decision” 
roughly parallels the line between substance and procedure. 
(3) Hanna’s “twin aims” line between FCL that has priority over state 
law and FCL that yields to state law also roughly parallels the line 
between substance and procedure. 
(4) Hanna therefore implements the RDA, which functions as a 
statutory choice-of-law rule waiving the otherwise applicable 
Supremacy Clause when FCL procedures conflict with 
substantive state rules. 
This argument is alluring because it provides a statutory foundation for doctrine 
that otherwise seems arbitrary. But the foundation collapses upon closer scrutiny. 
First, Hanna never cited the RDA.203 Neither did the circuit court decision that 
Hanna reversed.204 A theory positing that Hanna was trying to define “rules of 
decision” is therefore strained from the outset. 
John Hart Ely’s contrary argument that Hanna relied on the RDA is one of 
the many curiosities orbiting the Erie doctrine. Ely was a law clerk for Chief Justice 
Warren in the year that Warren authored Hanna.205 He was also a brilliant scholar 
who wrote an influential article about “The Irrepressible Myth of Erie” that 
repeatedly characterizes Hanna as relying on the RDA.206 Ely must have realized 
that Hanna never mentions the RDA. Yet he did not address this hole in his 
narrative. Ely’s article nevertheless was widely cited for the proposition that Hanna 
is an RDA case,207 thus propagating the type of “myth” that it was trying to repress. 
Second, the RDA does not provide guidance for determining when state law 
applies. The text’s reference to “cases where they apply” assumes that state laws 
sometimes apply in federal court. Yet the statute does not include language 
suggesting how courts should draw a line between “cases where they apply” and 
 
203. Hanna uses the phrase “rules of decision” once, but in the context of the creation inquiry 
and without invoking the RDA. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (holding that federal “rules 
of decision” must be “supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other 
section of the Constitution”). The phrase also appears in an excerpt from another case that Hanna 
quoted, but that case also did not cite the RDA. See id. at 465 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 
326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
204. See Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964), rev’d, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
205. See Ely, supra note 8, at 693 n.*. 
206. See, e.g., id. at 699 (“the major point” of Hanna “was its separation for purposes of analysis” 
of the RDA, REA, and Constitution); id. at 716 n.126 (“One of Hanna’s main points was that the Rules 
of Decision Act is more protective of state prerogatives than the Enabling Act.”). 
207. See Condlin, supra note 187, at 476–77 (2005) (noting Ely’s influence on courts  
and commentators). 
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cases where they do not apply. Hanna had the practical effect of drawing that line. 
Given that the RDA does not indicate how the line should be drawn, the RDA 
cannot be a foundation for Hanna. 
One can respond by arguing that the RDA might still justify Hanna under 
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. The phrase “cases where they apply” 
is ambiguous. Courts routinely interpret ambiguous statutory language. Potentially, 
Hanna can be understood as a case drawing a line that the Court thought the RDA 
required—if one looks past the lack of any citation to the RDA. This justification 
for Hanna can be viable only if the “cases where they apply” clause actually provides 
an enforceable standard. However, as explained in the next point, the RDA does 
not create a federal choice-of-law rule.208 
Third, long before Hanna, the Supreme Court concluded that the RDA did 
not create new choice-of-law requirements. Instead, Chief Justice Marshall observed 
that the RDA was “no more than a declaration of what the law would have been 
without it.”209 Marshall’s view as a Justice aligned with his prior statement at the 
Virginia ratifying convention that state law obviously would apply in  
diversity cases.210 
Erie cited the RDA but did not hold that the RDA is relevant to prioritization. 
Erie observed that federal judges improperly disregarded the RDA by allowing 
“general law” to displace state law.211 But Erie framed the federal judiciary’s cavalier 
reliance on general law as a problem of creation rather than prioritization. 
According to a literal reading of Erie, general law was not a type of law that the 
judiciary could enforce.212 
Erie’s treatment of general law was misleading because federal courts routinely 
enforce general law by incorporating it into FCL.213 A more accurate analysis would 
have acknowledged that federal courts sometimes consult general law, but general 
law is not self-executing. General law does not apply of its own force and is not a 
source of lawmaking power. Instead, general law is dispositive only when another 
source of enforceable law—such as a constitutional provision, statute, treaty, or 
FCL rule—makes general law dispositive. 
Thus, if the Court in Erie had been authorized to create FCL, it could have 
relied on general law to flesh out the FCL rule’s content. But the facts in Erie did 
not authorize the creation of FCL. Erie was a diversity action in which the only 
potential source of judicial lawmaking authority were the constitutional and 
 
208. Some scholars, notably Wilfred Ritz, interpret the phrase “laws of the several states” in the 
RDA to mean that federal courts must apply the aggregate common law of the United States rather 
than the law of an individual state. For a thorough critique of this argument, see Ernest A. Young, A 
General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 38–44 (2013). 
209. Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831). 
210. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 104 n.2. (1945). 
211. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). 
212. See id. at 78. 
213. See Erbsen, supra note 9, at 619–22. 
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statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction.214 Congress could have enacted a statute 
governing the case, which involved an accident in a channel of interstate 
commerce,215 but no such statute existed. Nevertheless, pre-Erie cases held that 
despite the absence of a federal claim or defense, the grant of diversity jurisdiction 
empowered federal courts to displace state law by “exercis[ing] an independent 
judgment.”216 Erie rejected these cases.217 Once the grant of diversity jurisdiction 
became irrelevant, there was no remaining constitutional, statutory, or treaty 
provision authorizing judicial creation of FCL. The Court’s inability to create FCL 
meant that it could not rely on general law. State law was the only available option 
for resolving the suit.218 
Accordingly, state law applied in Erie not because state law had priority over 
federal law, but because relevant federal laws did not exist. Congress had not acted, 
the grant of diversity jurisdiction did not authorize judicial creation of common law, 
and there was no other basis for the creation of common law on Erie’s facts.219 
Given that Erie was a case about the existence of federal law rather than federal 
law’s priority, the Court’s citation to the RDA did not imply a statutory priority rule. 
The RDA citation added nothing to Erie’s conclusion that general law was not  
self-executing and therefore was not directly available in a diversity case. The RDA 
merely confirmed that state law filled the void left by the absence of federal law.220 
In light of its declarative nature, the RDA does not create a choice-of-law rule. 
By definition, choice-of-law rules make choices. The RDA does not make choices. 
Instead, the RDA assumes the existence of choices made elsewhere. 
One might wonder why Congress would go through the effort of writing a 
statute that resembles a choice-of-law rule yet does not make choices. The answer 
seems to be that the RDA was added to the Judiciary Act early in the nation’s history 
and late in the drafting process. This origin creates “some doubt whether all [the 
relevant] issues had been completely thought through.”221 
 
214. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). 
215. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
216. See Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883). 
217. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
218. See id. (noting that state law applies by default when federal law is not available). But see id. 
at 91 (Reed, J., concurring) (“I am not at all sure whether, in the absence of federal statutory direction, 
federal courts would be compelled to follow state decisions.”). 
219. See infra Section II.B.4.a (noting various predicates for the creation of federal  
common law). 
220. According to Judge Friendly, this aspect of Erie’s reasoning may explain why the Court 
invoked the “Constitution” as a basis for the holding. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. On this view, if Congress 
has not regulated a particular subject, and if the federal judiciary lacks power to create federal common 
law, then there is no available source of law capable of displacing state law consistently with the 
Constitution’s allocation of power between the national and state governments. See Henry J. Friendly, 
In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385, 394–95 (1964). 
221. Id. at 396–97 n.65; see also William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1527 (1984) (“[The 
RDA] was apparently added to the Judiciary Act as an after-thought.”). 
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Accordingly, another source of law exogenous to the RDA draws the line 
between “cases where [state laws] apply” and cases where they don’t. The RDA then 
declares what should happen after that line is drawn. Hanna’s effort to assess FCL’s 
priority therefore cannot rely on the RDA because the RDA does not purport to 
create a priority standard. 
This conclusion about the RDA’s inability to sustain Hanna is consistent with 
Judge (then-Professor) William Fletcher’s analysis of the RDA in a landmark 
article.222 Fletcher’s primary point was that the founding generation interpreted the 
RDA’s reference to “state” law as encompassing only “local” law rather than 
“general” law.223 Federal courts could therefore disregard state court decisions 
regarding matters within the ambit of general law, such as the enforcement of 
marine insurance contracts.224 Fletcher went on to observe that the RDA was 
enacted at a time when choice-of-law jurisprudence was “undeveloped,” and that 
the RDA did not expressly make choices about when non-state law or state law 
would apply.225 The absence of an express choice was not controversial because 
federal courts applied the same lex loci approach in civil cases (to which the RDA 
applied) as they applied in equity and admiralty cases (to which the RDA did not 
apply).226 Erie eventually repudiated the local/general distinction that Fletcher 
identified as the RDA’s pre-Erie core.227 After Erie stripped this founding-era gloss, 
the RDA persisted as a statute that presumed the existence of an exogenous  
choice-of-law rule without itself articulating choice-of-law criteria. 
Fourth, the source of law that makes choices about when federal law applies 
in federal court is the Supremacy Clause. It is an explicit choice-of-law provision 
that elevates “Laws of the United States” above “Laws of any State.”228 The 
Supremacy Clause also presciently anticipates that state courts would try to 
circumvent federal supremacy, so it compels “Judges in every State” to follow 
federal law.229 
The RDA fills a gap in the Supremacy Clause. The Clause explains what 
happens when valid federal law encompasses a disputed issue. But it is silent about 
what happens when federal law is not available. State law was the obvious gap filler, 
at least when general law could not apply. Congress presciently anticipated that 
federal courts would try to avoid applying state law, as they in fact did until Erie. 
The RDA therefore pushes back on nationalist impulses that undermine state 
interests by instructing federal courts to respect state law—at a minimum on local 
matters, and perhaps also more broadly—when federal law does not apply. 
 
222. See Fletcher, supra note 221. 
223. Id. at 1516–17. 
224. See id. at 1553. 
225. Id. at 1516, 1531. 
226. See id. at 1527–49. 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 216–23. 
228. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
229. Id. 
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Fifth, the omission of foreign law and territorial law from the RDA further 
suggests that Congress believed that a choice-of-law rule exogenous to the RDA 
established priority between federal law and competing sources of authority. The 
statute that contained the RDA also authorized federal alienage jurisdiction.230 Many 
alienage cases would have implicated either foreign law or general law.231 Either 
way, state law would not apply. The RDA cannot resolve the priority inquiry when 
federal law conflicts with foreign or general law because the RDA never mentions 
foreign or general law. Principles exogenous to the RDA must have  
governed prioritization. 
The Court’s treatment of federal territorial law, such as Hawaiian law before 
statehood, also supports the RDA’s assumption of an exogenous choice-of-law rule. 
The Court held that the RDA did not require deference to Hawaiian law, but 
deferred to it anyway as a matter of policy.232 The RDA is similarly silent about 
priority in cases implicating the law of Native American tribes. However, federal 
cases requiring a choice between federal and tribal law are rare because of doctrine 
limiting both federal and tribal jurisdiction.233 In any event, choice of law in 
territorial and tribal cases emerges from a source exogenous to the RDA.234 
A counter-argument to the relevance of foreign law and territorial law is that 
Congress in 1789 may have anticipated the Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon that 
required federal courts to apply state choice-of-law rules.235 If this  
 
230. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
231. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(assuming that alienage cases could implicate “the general law of nations” or “lex loci”); 3 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1692, at 570 (1833) 
(“[T]he law to be administered in cases of foreigners is often very distinct from the mere municipal 
code of a state, and dependent upon the law merchant, or the more enlarged consideration of 
international rights and duties, in the case of conflict of the foreign and domestic laws.”); Kevin  
R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10–16 (1996) (noting  
founding-era hope that alienage jurisdiction would give foreign creditors confidence that federal courts 
would enforce debts). 
232. See Waialua Agric. Co. v. Christian, 305 U.S. 91, 109 (1938). The RDA also does not apply 
to the District of Columbia, but the D.C. Circuit nevertheless applies Hanna to local diversity cases. See 
Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1278 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
233. Tribes have limited legislative jurisdiction. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 
(1997) (“[A]bsent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct 
of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”). When tribal law may apply, plaintiffs must 
“exhaust available tribal remedies before” filing a federal question or diversity suit in federal court. Iowa 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987). After exhausting tribal remedies, parties in federal court 
cannot relitigate tribal law issues (although they can challenge the tribal court’s jurisdiction). See id. 
Accordingly, federal courts will rarely have occasion to consider a conflict between federal and  
tribal law. 
234. This Article expresses no view about where the exogenous choice-of-law rule addressing 
foreign and territorial law comes from and what it requires. In contrast, the Article contends that the 
Supremacy Clause is the choice-of-law rule exogenous to the RDA that addresses conflicts between 
federal and state law. Another “choice of law” regime governs the decision about whether courts should 
create federal common law. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
235. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941). 
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counter-argument is valid, then the RDA could govern the choice between federal 
law and whatever non-federal law a state would choose, including foreign and 
territorial law. However, the counter-argument is flawed because the 1789 Congress 
understood choice of law as a form of general law rather than state law.236 The 
RDA’s reference to state law is therefore not a reference to state choice-of-law rules. 
Accordingly, Klaxon does not implement the RDA’s text. Instead, Klaxon attempts 
to enforce Erie’s policy preferences about federalism and forum shopping.237 (And, 
as I have argued elsewhere, Klaxon does so in a misguided and counterproductive 
manner.)238 The RDA’s reference to state law thus would have been irrelevant in 
cases involving foreign law and territorial law. This omission further confirms that 
federal choice-of-law rules arise from a source exogenous to the RDA. 
Finally, the Court deferred to state law in equity cases even though the RDA 
at the time did not cover equity.239 Here again, the preference for state law must 
have had a source exogenous to the RDA.240 
In sum, the Supremacy Clause rather than the RDA determines FCL’s priority. 
The RDA is relevant only when supreme federal law is unavailable. Whether federal 
law is available depends on Erie’s creation and interpretation inquiries.241 This 
framework does not leave space for Hanna’s multi-factored approach to  
FCL’s priority. 
III. CURRENT PRIORITIZATION JURISPRUDENCE RELIES ON AN UNSUSTAINABLE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND OTHER CATEGORIES OF 
FEDERAL LAW 
Part II established that the prioritization inquiry has two distinct strands. One 
strand is straightforward and mechanical, while the other is convoluted and fuzzy. 
Under the mechanical strand, four categories of valid federal law automatically 
displace inconsistent state law: the Constitution, statutes, self-executing treaties, and 
 
236. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 594 
(2003) (noting in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that “members of the founding 
generation expected the necessary choice-of-law rules to come from the general law of nations”); Mark 
D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 1030–31 (2015) 
(“American courts in the pre-Erie era conceptualized domestic choice-of-law as part of the general law, 
and more specifically, as an extension of private international law.”). 
237. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1494 (2013) 
(“Klaxon has its source in the twin aims [of Erie] and not in the Rules of Decision Act.”) 
238. See Erbsen, supra note 9, at 638–46 (criticizing Klaxon). 
239. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103––04 (1945). Although York deferred to state 
law in equity cases after Erie, pre-Erie federal equity cases often applied judge-made federal law rather 
than state law. See Collins, supra note 52, at 338–39. 
240. For an example of why equity’s potential status as preemptive common law matters, see 
Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Our Equity: Federalism and Chancery, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 176, 254–65 (2017) 
(discussing whether federal or state law governs the standards for a preliminary injunction in  
diversity cases). 
241. Cf. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983) (holding that 
when a valid federal statute that is silent about limitations periods is interpreted to authorize an FCL 
limitations period, the RDA does not require applying state law). 
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delegated rules. Under the fuzzy strand, a multi-factor test determines  
FCL’s priority. 
This Part considers whether the line between FCL and other forms of federal 
law is a sensible basis for segmenting Erie’s prioritization inquiry. The line turns out 
to be arbitrary for at least two reasons. First, rules promulgated under the REA 
authorize federal courts to create common law that preempts state law. This fluid 
continuity between the statute, delegated rules, and common law eviscerates 
Hanna’s premise that procedural common law warrants a unique prioritization 
inquiry. Second, many forms of FCL beyond the REA context likewise have a 
foundation in positive law. Labeling an FCL rule as “judge made” is a misguided 
way to address subtle questions about the rule’s practical effect. The creation and 
interpretation inquiries address these questions more directly than Hanna’s 
haphazard balancing approach. 
A. In the Rules Enabling Act Context, There Is No Bright Line Between Common Law 
and Statutorily Authorized Rules 
A critical problem with Hanna’s bifurcation is that delegated rules expressly 
authorize federal courts to create common law. Moreover, many delegated rules 
provide minimal guidance to courts. Implementation of these rules produces 
outcomes that are only nominally tethered to text. The boundary between text, 
interpretation of text, and common law is therefore elusive. Accordingly, Hanna’s 
fixation on the difference between delegated rules and common law fails to provide 
a coherent basis for implementing the prioritization inquiry. 
Section 1 illustrates how delegated rules authorize creation of common law 
through what I call the “Any Manner” clauses. Section 2 shows that the Any Manner 
clauses preempt state law. Section 3 then explains why the Any Manner clauses 
undermine current prioritization jurisprudence. 
The FRCP’s historical origins help frame the discussion. Prior to the FRCP, 
the Conformity Act required federal courts to apply state procedures (with some 
exceptions).242 The content of procedural rules applied in federal court therefore 
varied from district to district. A widely understood virtue of the REA was that it 
permitted the Supreme Court to promulgate roughly uniform nationwide rules 
supplemented by local districtwide rules.243 When these formal rules were silent 
about a disputed issue, a question arose about whether federal or state law would 
fill gaps. In the same year that courts started to fill gaps in the new FRCP, the 
Supreme Court decided Erie. This Section considers how Erie applies to gap-filling 
procedural rules. 
 
242. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. For a history of federal procedure 
before the REA, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,  
1035–42 (1982). 
243. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064. The REA also authorized the Supreme 
Court to merge law and equity procedures. See id. § 2. 
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1. The “Any Manner” Clauses: Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Judicial 
Authority to Create Procedural Common Law 
Four sets of rules promulgated under the REA include “Any Manner” Clauses 
authorizing the creation of common law. For example, FRCP 83(b) states: 
PROCEDURE WHEN THERE IS NO CONTROLLING LAW. A judge may 
regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules. No 
sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with 
any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local rules unless 
the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual 
notice of the requirement.244 
Materially identical Any Manner clauses appear in the FRCrimP, FRAP, and 
FRBP.245 The Habeas Rules incorporate the FRCP and FRCrimP Any Manner 
clauses.246 The FRE do not include an analogous clause. A potential explanation for 
this omission is that the FRE already offer sufficient discretion to choose between 
the binary alternatives of admitting and excluding evidence, so there is no need for 
a gap-filling clause.247 
All four Any Manner clauses presumably have a similar purpose and meaning. 
As shown in the following table, the latter three were modeled on FRCP 83(b), and 
all four were then rewritten together in 1995: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
244. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). FRCP’s 83(b)’s text evolved from Rule 44 of the Supreme Court’s 
Admiralty Rules, which provided: 
RIGHT OF TRIAL COURTS TO MAKE RULE OF PRACTICE. In suits in admiralty in all cases 
not provided for by these rules or by statute, the district courts are to regulate their practice 
in such a manner as they deem most expedient for the due administration of justice, provided 
the same are not inconsistent with these rules. 
ADMIRALTY RULE 44, 254 U.S. 671, 698 (1920); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes to 
1937 enactment (citing Rule 44). Pre-REA admiralty practice relied on a mix of national rules, local 
rules, and rules developed “according to the discretion of the presiding judge.” 1 ERASTUS  
C. BENEDICT & GEORGE V. A. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY § 679 (5th ed. 1925). 
245. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b); FED. R. APP. P. 47(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(b). The relevant 
text of these rules appears in the table on the following page. See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8026(b) (“A 
district court or BAP may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, applicable federal 
rules, the Official Forms, and local rules.”). The rationale for the addition to the appellate rule of the 
phrase “in a particular case”—which is absent from the civil, criminal, and bankruptcy rules—is not 
clear. This unique language cannot prevent appellate courts from applying the same common law rules 
to many different cases. It therefore does not serve any apparent limiting function. 
246. See HABEAS RULE 12 (incorporating the entire FRCP and FRCrimP). 
247. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA 
L. REV. 413, 439 (1989) (discussing “open-textured” standards and catch-all provisions). 
First to Printer_Erbsen.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/7/20  7:28 AM 
1150 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1101 
FE
D
. R
. B
A
N
K
R.
 P
. 9
02
9 
   In
 a
ll 
ca
se
s n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r b
y 
ru
le,
 th
e 
co
ur
t 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
its
 p
ra
ct
ice
 in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r n
ot
 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
es
e 
ru
les
 o
r t
ho
se
 o
f t
he
 
di
st
ric
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
co
ur
t a
ct
s. 
[1
98
6,
 sl
ig
ht
ly 
am
en
di
ng
 1
98
2 
ve
rs
io
n.
] 
(B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
CO
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, 
th
es
e 
ru
les
, O
ff
ici
al 
Fo
rm
s, 
an
d 
lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 o
f t
he
 
di
st
ric
t. 
N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r n
on
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
no
t i
n 
fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, O
ff
ici
al 
Fo
rm
s, 
or
 
th
e 
lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 o
f t
he
 d
ist
ric
t u
nl
es
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
fu
rn
ish
ed
 in
 th
e 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 a
ct
ua
l n
ot
ice
 o
f t
he
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
Se
e 
ab
ov
e. 
FE
D
. R
. A
PP
. P
. 4
7 
  In
 a
ll 
ca
se
s n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r b
y 
ru
le,
 th
e 
co
ur
ts
 o
f 
ap
pe
als
 m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
th
eir
 p
ra
ct
ice
 in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r 
no
t i
nc
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
es
e 
ru
les
.  
 (B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
CO
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 c
ou
rt 
of
 a
pp
ea
ls 
m
ay
 
re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 c
as
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r 
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, t
he
se
 ru
les
, a
nd
 lo
ca
l 
ru
les
 o
f t
he
 c
irc
ui
t. 
N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r n
on
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 
w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t n
ot
 in
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, o
r t
he
 lo
ca
l c
irc
ui
t r
ul
es
 u
nl
es
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
fu
rn
ish
ed
 in
 th
e 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 a
ct
ua
l n
ot
ice
 o
f t
he
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
Se
e 
ab
ov
e. 
FE
D
. R
. C
RI
M
.  P
. 5
7 
 (B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
 N
O
T 
O
TH
E
RW
IS
E
 S
PE
CI
FI
E
D
. I
f 
no
 p
ro
ce
du
re
 is
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 b
y 
ru
le,
 th
e 
co
ur
t m
ay
 p
ro
ce
ed
 in
 a
ny
 la
w
fu
l m
an
ne
r n
ot
 
in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
es
e 
ru
les
 o
r w
ith
 a
ny
 
ap
pl
ica
bl
e 
st
at
ut
e. 
  (B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
C O
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, 
th
es
e 
ru
les
, a
nd
 lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 o
f t
he
 d
ist
ric
t. 
N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r n
on
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t n
ot
 in
 
fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, o
r t
he
 lo
ca
l d
ist
ric
t r
ul
es
 
un
les
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
fu
rn
ish
ed
 in
 
th
e 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 a
ct
ua
l n
ot
ice
 o
f t
he
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
(B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
C O
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, 
th
es
e 
ru
les
, a
nd
 lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 o
f t
he
 d
ist
ric
t. 
N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r n
on
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t n
ot
 in
 
fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, o
r t
he
 lo
ca
l d
ist
ric
t r
ul
es
 
un
les
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 w
as
 fu
rn
ish
ed
 w
ith
 
ac
tu
al 
no
tic
e 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
no
nc
om
pl
ian
ce
. [
20
02
] 
F E
D
. R
. C
IV
. P
. 8
3 
In
 a
ll 
ca
se
s n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r b
y 
ru
le,
 th
e 
di
st
ric
t 
co
ur
ts
 m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
th
eir
 p
ra
ct
ice
 in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r 
no
t i
nc
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
es
e 
ru
les
. 
  In
 a
ll 
ca
se
s n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
fo
r b
y 
ru
le,
 th
e 
di
st
ric
t 
ju
dg
e 
an
d 
m
ag
ist
ra
te
s m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
th
eir
 p
ra
ct
ice
 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r n
ot
 in
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
es
e 
ru
les
 o
r 
th
os
e 
of
 th
e 
di
st
ric
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 a
ct
. [
19
85
] 
(B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
C O
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, 
ru
les
 a
do
pt
ed
 u
nd
er
 2
8 
U
.S
.C
. §
§ 
20
72
 a
nd
 2
07
5,
 
an
d 
lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 o
f t
he
 d
ist
ric
t. 
N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 
ot
he
r d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r 
no
nc
om
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t n
ot
 in
 
fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, o
r t
he
 lo
ca
l d
ist
ric
t r
ul
es
 
un
les
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
fu
rn
ish
ed
 in
 
th
e 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 a
ct
ua
l n
ot
ice
 o
f t
he
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
(B
) P
RO
CE
D
U
RE
S 
W
H
E
N
 T
H
E
RE
 IS
 N
O
 
C O
N
TR
O
LL
IN
G
 L
A
W
. A
 ju
dg
e 
m
ay
 re
gu
lat
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 a
ny
 m
an
ne
r c
on
sis
te
nt
 w
ith
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, 
ru
les
 a
do
pt
ed
 u
nd
er
 2
8 
U
.S
.C
. §
§ 
20
72
 a
nd
 2
07
5,
 
an
d 
th
e 
di
st
ric
t’s
 lo
ca
l r
ul
es
. N
o 
sa
nc
tio
n 
or
 o
th
er
 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
 m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
se
d 
fo
r n
on
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 
w
ith
 a
ny
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t n
ot
 in
 fe
de
ra
l l
aw
, f
ed
er
al 
ru
les
, o
r t
he
 lo
ca
l r
ul
es
 u
nl
es
s t
he
 a
lle
ge
d 
vi
ol
at
or
 
ha
s b
ee
n 
fu
rn
ish
ed
 in
 th
e 
pa
rti
cu
lar
 c
as
e 
w
ith
 
ac
tu
al 
no
tic
e 
of
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
[2
00
7]
 
Y
ea
r 
19
38
 
19
44
 
19
67
 
19
85
/8
6 
19
95
 
Cu
rr
en
t 
A
fte
r 
Re
st
yli
ng
 
A
m
en
ds
. 
Table 1. Evolution of Any Manner Clauses (Principal Amendments) 
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Of course, identical phrases within a set of rules can have different meanings 
in different contexts.248 But assuming a shared meaning is a useful starting point 
absent evidence of any material variation in purpose. I therefore focus on the 
language of FRCP 83(b) as a proxy for its siblings.249 
The plain meaning of the Any Manner clause suggests a broad authorization 
of federal common law. Precedent and comments by rulemakers support this 
interpretation. 
First, the clause applies to all aspects of “practice” without limitation. 
“Practice” is coextensive with “procedure” in the paragraph heading. There is no 
reason to believe that the clause governs only a subset of the procedures 
encompassed in the heading. Nor is there any plausible definition of “practice” that 
would constitute such a subset.250 “Procedure” and “practice” may once have had 
distinct meanings,251 but the distinction has not survived in the modern  
rulemaking context.252 
Second, the original 1938 text of Rule 83 stated that the Any Manner clause 
applied “in all cases not provided for by rule.”253 The reference to “cases” suggests 
that the clause enabled common law to fill gaps in written rules that did not 
anticipate novel circumstances. There is no indication that subsequent amendments 
sought to alter this meaning. 
Statements from the original rulemakers confirm that the Any Manner clause 
intended to authorize gap-filling common law.254 For example, Edgar Tolman 
stressed the importance of using federal common law rather than state law to fill 
gaps in the FRCP. Tolman observed that: 
 
248. See Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 771–72 (2012) 
(analyzing the FRCP’s distinct uses of “transaction and occurrence” and “common question of law  
or fact”). 
249. FRCP 83(b) contained the first Any Manner Clause promulgated under the REA. It 
therefore may carry historical baggage (such as pressure to circumvent the Conformity Act) that did 
not affect subsequent Any Manner Clauses. However, by borrowing Rule 83(b)’s language, the 
subsequent clauses apparently incorporated Rule 83(b)’s practical implications. 
250. The REA also uses the phrase “practice and procedure,” 28  
U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018), but the Court has not found the distinction meaningful. 
251. See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (distinguishing “practice, 
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding”). 
252. See Thomas F. Green, Jr., The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55  
HARV. L. REV. 197, 205 (1941) (noting in context of FRCP 83 that “practice and procedure” are often 
used “synonymously”); Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of 
Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 634 (1957) (“Considering the accepted definitions of the 
terms ‘practice’ and ‘procedure,’ and recognizing the types of matters which have been held to be within 
the term ‘practice’ as used in the rule-making grant of authority [in state statutes], it seems clear that the 
words are generally used synonymously.”). 
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 (1938 version). 
254. The Supreme Court has given “weight” to the original rulemakers’ “construction” 
expressed in the materials discussed in this paragraph. Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 
444 (1946) (analyzing FRCP 4(f)). 
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[The sentence containing the Any Manner clause] is, in my opinion, one of 
the most important and salutary in the entire set of rules. It closes all gaps 
in the rules. It puts an end to the whole of the Conformity Act, and it 
permits judges to decide the unusual or minor procedural problems that 
arise in any system of jurisprudence in the light of the circumstances that 
surround them and of the justice of the case without the complications and 
injustice that must attend attempts to forecast the situations and to regulate 
them in advance either by general or by local rule.255 
Similarly, Rules Committee Chairman William Mitchell rejected mandatory 
interstitial conformity with state law. Mitchell asked: “Suppose a point arises that is 
not covered by the Supreme Court rules or by the local district rules, what practice 
prevails?”256 He then contended that federal courts could fill gaps without relying 
on state law: 
That brings you flat up against the question whether the gap should be 
filled by the application of the conformity statute, requiring the court to 
follow local state practice to fill the gap. The last sentence in [Rule 83] is 
full of meat. ‘In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may 
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.’ 
That doesn’t say they must follow the state practice under the Conformity 
Act. They may follow the state practice, if they think that is an adequate 
one, and probably will in most cases, but the Conformity Act does not fill 
the gap. The district judges fill it. We hope there are not going to be many 
gaps, but you never can tell, and we had to provide for that situation.257 
Likewise, James Wm. Moore, who helped draft the FRCP, thought that Rule 83’s 
Any Manner clause was “an omnibus provision” allowing case-by-case resolution 
of procedural disputes.258 This flexibility “eliminates all necessity to fall back on the 
Conformity Act.”259 A Justice Department official who worked with the rulemakers 
likewise interpreted the Any Manner clause as a gap-filler. He concluded that the 
clause signified that “the entire field of civil procedure is covered by the judicial 
rule making power. Consequently, the Conformity Act must be deemed to have 
been repealed.”260 The modern Advisory Committee notes are consistent with 
contemporary accounts, reflecting a desire to retain judicial “flexibility.”261 
 
255. ABA, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 129 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 
1938) [hereinafter WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Edgar Tolman). 
256. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES CLEVELAND, OHIO JULY 21, 22, 23, 1938, at 189 (William  
W. Dawson ed., 1938) (statement of William Mitchell). 
257. Id. 
258. 3 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3443 (1938 
& Supp 1954). 
259. Id. at 3444. 
260. ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 163 (1940). 
261. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) advisory committee notes to 1995 amendment; see also Stephen  
N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 
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The drafting history of Rule 83 further confirms the broad interpretation 
allowing gap-filling common law. In 1935, a precursor to the Any Manner clause 
was draft rule A38, which stated: 
All matters not provided for by a valid statute, or by these rules, or by the 
rules of the various district courts made pursuant to the authority 
hereinafter given shall be governed by the common law as developed and 
applied in the federal courts.262 
A drafting note by Charles Clark—the committee’s reporter—justified this rule as 
“better” than “attempting to absorb the particular state practice.”263 The note then 
opined: “Now that we are rid of the Conformity Act, let us stay rid of it.”264 
The precise meaning of “common law” in draft rule A38 is opaque because 
the draft predates Erie. The draft could therefore refer to federal common law as 
we use the term today, or general law as it existed before Erie.265 A related ambiguity 
is that federal courts prior to the FRCP implemented the Conformity Act.266 Federal 
decisions therefore relied on rules with disparate origins in federal, general, and state 
law. This mélange of sources complicated efforts “to determine what the  
common-law administration by the Federal courts is.”267 Nevertheless, despite the 
nebulous contours of “common law,” Clark’s express repudiation of the 
Conformity Act confirms that rulemakers wanted to fill gaps on a case-by-case basis 
with something other than state law. The reworking of Rule A38 into Rule 83 
changed the textual basis for federalization but did not retreat from the basic goal. 
Third, the reference to “any manner consistent with federal law”268 suggests 
that federal courts can create, literally, “any” procedural common law that other 
sources of federal law do not prohibit. Accordingly, the four Any Manner clauses 
authorize a wide range of federal procedural common law governing civil, criminal, 
appellate, and bankruptcy proceedings. 
Courts have endorsed this broad interpretation of judicial authority to create 
common law. For example, the Supreme Court cited FRCP 83(b)’s Any Manner 
clause to justify “measures to regulate the actions of the parties to a multiparty 
 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2014 n.74 (1989) (suggesting that the Any Manner clauses authorize  
“case-by-case” adjudication and “standing orders” to fill gaps in the FRCP); Hill, supra note 14, at 105 
(observing that Rule 83 empowers “procedural improvisation”). 
262.  See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIV. PROC., TENTATIVE DRAFT II, Rule A38  
(Dec. 26, 1935) (available in binder of Advisory Committee materials in the collection of the 
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Legal Research Center). 
263. Id. 
264. Id.; see also Subrin, supra note 261, at 2013–14 (stating that Clark wrote the note). 
265. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
266. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. 
267. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL 
PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES., Feb. 25, 1936, at 1509 [hereinafter 
ADVISORY COMM. PROCEEDINGS] (comment by Edson Sunderland). 
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). 
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suit,”269 as “general authorization” for the kinds of orders that Rule 23 specifically 
authorizes in class actions,270 and as allowing sua sponte dismissal of a complaint 
after plaintiffs’ counsel failed to attend a pretrial conference.271 Dicta in criminal 
cases suggests that the Court reads criminal Rule 57(b) similarly to civil Rule 
83(b).272 Lower federal courts have also interpreted Any Manner clauses to 
authorize a wide range of rules.273 
The broad delegation of power in the Any Manner clauses is not unlimited. 
The clauses cannot exceed the REA delegation that authorized them. So the Any 
Manner clauses cannot authorize courts to “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”274 Other sources of federal common lawmaking power can 
authorize substantive rules,275 but not the Any Manner Clauses. The clauses are also 
self-limiting, as they forbid inconsistency with other sources of federal law, 
including REA-derived rules.276 Common law must also govern “practice” and 
“procedure,” as defined in both the REA and the clauses themselves.277 Finally, 
 
269. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 172 (1989) (discussing judicial role in 
“facilitat[ing] notice” in class actions). 
270. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 n.10 (1981). 
271. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 n.8 (1962). 
272. In Black v. United States, the Court cited Criminal Rule 57(b) as support for the 
proposition that “the absence of a Criminal Rule authorizing special verdicts” was not “dispositive” of 
whether such verdicts were allowed. 561 U.S. 465, 472 n.10 (2010). Similarly, in United States v. New 
York Telephone Co., the Court stated that Rule 57(b)’s Any Manner clause “reinforced” a conclusion 
that district courts could issue search warrants authorizing pen registers.  
434 U.S. 159, 170 (1977) (not reaching the question of whether rule 57(b) could apply “by itself”). 
273. See, e.g., Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that FRCrimP 
57(b) “informs us what a court may do” with grand jury records when other “[r]ules are silent”); In re 
Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing FRCP 83(b) as confirming judges’ “inherent 
power” to manage individual cases); Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing FRCP 
83(b) to justify sua sponte dismissal order that was not “explicitly authorized . . . by statute or rule”); 
United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 339 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing FRCrimP 57(b) as consistent with 
the district court’s “inherent powers” to order psychiatric exams); In re Requested Extradition of Kirby, 
106 F.3d 855, 857 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing FRAP 47 as authority to determine the timeliness of an 
appeal when other rules were inapplicable); In re Cannonsburg Envtl. Assocs., Ltd., 72 F.3d 1260, 1269 
(6th Cir. 1996) (citing FRBP 8018 to justify consolidating two appeals); Davis v. IRS, 905 F. Supp. 2d 
1253, 1254 (D.N.M. 2012) (citing FRCP 83(b) to justify striking a filing); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Def., 395 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing FRCP 83(b) to justify ordering a party to seek 
information from a nonparty); In re Murray, 199 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that 
FRBP 9029(b) tracks FRCP 83(b) in allowing case-by-case “gap-filling” by incorporating into 
bankruptcy procedure a provision of the FRCP governing capacity to sue). 
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). The Supreme Court treats written rules promulgated through 
the rigorous Enabling Act process as “presumptive[ly]” procedural. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 
U.S. 1, 6 (1987). That presumption should not extend to common law that receives much less vetting. 
275. See supra Section II.B.4.a. 
276. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425 (1996) (declining to 
apply FRCrimP 57 when doing so would be “inconsistent” with FRCrimP 29). 
277. There is some uncertainty about whether practice and procedure encompass evidentiary 
rules. However, that concern is moot given that the REA separately authorizes “rules of evidence.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(a); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 654, 663–65 (2019) (considering how the history of the FRE informs the definition of 
“procedural” in the REA). 
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Article III limits the Any Manner clauses because Congress presumably cannot 
authorize courts to do more than the “judicial Power” permits. However, an actual 
conflict with Article III is difficult to imagine because the clauses are already limited 
to non-substantive laws that are consistent with federal statutes and  
REA-derived rules. 
2. The Any Manner Clauses Authorize Preemption of State Law 
Denying preemption to rules derived from the Any Manner clauses would 
needlessly thwart the REA’s goal of uniform federal procedures. Under a 
hypothetical regime without preemption, federal law would govern only some 
aspects of procedure and state law would fill the gaps. The statements from 
rulemakers quoted above anticipated and rejected this possibility of hybrid 
regulation.278 Gap-filling content arising from the Any Manner clauses was 
therefore intended to be just as preemptive as content found elsewhere in  
REA-derived rules. 
The REA’s supersession clause may further support preemption, depending 
on whether its reference to “all laws” encompasses only federal law or also state 
law.279 The Any Manner clauses disclaim some aspects of supersession—common 
law must be consistent with other “federal” law280—but do not disclaim the 
preemption of state law. Rule 83’s authors could have added state law to the list of 
laws that federal courts must respect, but chose to limit the list to federal sources. 
One can try to resist this conclusion about FRCP 83(b)’s broad preemptive 
scope by positing that the Rule’s reference to respecting “federal law” includes 
federal prioritization rules. Courts developing gap-filling federal common law 
would therefore exercise restraint in order to respect the federal prioritization rule 
that Hanna embodies.281 However, neither the text of Rule 83(b) nor the drafting 
history mention or support this theory. The more plausible reading is that Rule 83 
does not silently incorporate a prioritization rule that did not exist when Rule 83 
was adopted. Moreover, prioritization is relevant only when there is a conflict of 
laws, and a conflict can exist only after courts ascertain the content of federal law. 
Rule 83(b) is a mechanism for creating federal law, so its implementation precedes 
the question of how to prioritize gap-filling federal common law that conflicts with 
state law. Accordingly, Rule 83(b)’s reference to respecting exogenous “federal law” 
is not a reason to treat gap-filling federal common law as non-preemptive. 
Of course, the fact that federal courts can create preemptive gap-filling 
common law does not mean that they should. Rule 83(b) grants discretion rather 
than mandating a particular outcome. Concerns that courts will abuse their 
 
278. See supra text accompanying notes 254–64. 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 119–22. 
280. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). 
281. See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After 
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1131, 1153 n.127 (2011) (developing and then rejecting this 
line of argument). 
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discretion implicate either Erie’s creation inquiry (there will be too much federal 
law) or its interpretation inquiry (federal law will be interpreted too expansively). 
Courts implementing Any Manner clauses must therefore carefully consider the 
federalism and separation of powers principles that animate Erie.282 Confronting 
those principles directly would produce clearer reasoning than confronting them 
indirectly by linking Rule 83(b)’s scope to Hanna’s fuzzy “twin aims” test. 
A narrower interpretation of the Any Manner Clause’s preemptive scope is 
possible but implausible. The REA arguably may authorize preemption only when 
the content of rules arises from formal notice-and-comment procedures rather than 
informal common law adjudication. This interpretation would recognize concerns 
raised in related contexts by scholars who stress the importance of compliance with 
the REA’s transparency and deliberation requirements.283 
Even if the distinction between formal and informal rulemaking rests on an 
attractive preference for notice and comment, deeming the distinction relevant to 
preemption has no foundation in the REA’s text. The text’s reference to “general 
rules of practice and procedure” extends preemption to all rules promulgated using 
the REA’s rulemaking procedures, which includes rules containing Any  
Manner clauses.284 
The formal/informal distinction also relies on a flawed premise that judicial 
opinions interpreting a text are distinguishable from opinions exercising rulemaking 
discretion granted by the text. The distinction presumes that when a judge 
implements most FRCP provisions, the judge is merely interpreting text 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The legitimacy conferred 
by notice and comment thus flows through the text and into the opinion. In 
contrast, the distinction posits that when a judge invokes an Any Manner clause, the 
judge is exercising discretion to impose an outcome that the rulemakers never 
directly authorized. This discretion creates a break between the outcome and the 
notice-and-comment process legitimizing the text. 
 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29 (explaining that the decision about whether to 
create federal common law is a form of “choice of law,” but that this is a different kind of choice than 
what occurs during the prioritization inquiry). 
283. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 
60 DUKE L.J. 597, 656 (2010) (criticizing the Court’s efforts to alter procedural rules through 
interpretation rather than exercising “the self-discipline required to show appropriate respect for the 
procedural lawmaking system Congress established in 1934”); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, 
The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA  
L. REV. 1188 (2012) (analogizing procedural rulemaking to substantive rulemaking by administrative 
agencies); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1152–69 (2002) (emphasizing the guiding role of advisory committee notes). 
But see Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683, 687 
(2014) (“For certain types of procedural rules, rulemakers should abandon the task of trying to regulate 
procedure by promulgating rules or standards . . . . Instead, they should turn their attention to regulating 
the process by which judges make procedural decisions . . . .”). 
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018); see also infra text accompanying notes 319–22 (discussing 
meaning of “general” rules). 
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Trying to marginalize Rule 83 based on a distinction between interpretation 
and rulemaking overlooks the fact that numerous FRCP provisions grant broad 
discretion to augment the text. For example, FRCP 42(a)(3) specifies options for 
judges but allows them to “issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or 
delay.”285 Similar “any other” clauses abound.286 These open-ended rules blur the 
line between interpretation and rulemaking. A judge issuing “any other” order and 
a judge regulating procedure in “any manner” are equivalently grounded in text. 
They are either both creating law, both interpreting law, or both engaging in a hybrid 
of creation and interpretation. 
Kevin Clermont provided a helpful metaphor by distinguishing between “the 
text of the Rules” and the “gloss that adheres to them.”287 In the Erie context, courts 
are often unsure about whether gloss is an independent layer (judicially created 
common law) or an integral part of the text it envelops (an interpretation). Hanna 
tries to drive a wedge between interpretive gloss and common law gloss even when 
the space between them is imperceptibly thin. 
FRCP 16 provides an especially stark example of why the distinction between 
rulemaking and interpretation cannot justify marginalizing Rule 83 from the rest of 
the FRCP. Rule 16(c)(2) enumerates fourteen distinct judicial powers. Some of 
these—such as a provision allowing “special procedures for managing potentially 
difficult or protracted actions”288—mirror Rule 83(b) by authorizing improvisation. 
Yet even these fourteen broad powers were insufficient to achieve Rule 16’s 
aspirations. Rule 16(c)(2) therefore includes a catch-all clause allowing courts to 
“facilitat[e] in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the 
action.”289 Rule 1 provides similar policy guidance by mandating that the entire 
FRCP “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”290 Thus, the same guidance (“just, speedy, and inexpensive”) 
constrains judicial flexibility under both Rule 16(c)(2)(P)’s “other ways” clause and 
Rule 83(b)’s “any manner” clause. Moreover, every opinion implementing the 
“other ways” clause could also cite the “any manner” clause because both clauses 
have the same purpose: to address unpredictable circumstances beyond the scope 
of precise textual provisions. The choice of citation should not influence the scope 
 
285. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(3). 
286. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (court may issue “any other appropriate order” when a party 
disobeys an order seeking a more definite statement); id. at 16(f) (court may issue “any just orders” 
imposing sanctions); id. at 49(a)(1)(C) (court may use “any other method” for obtaining special verdicts); 
id. at 56(d)(3) (court may “issue any other appropriate order” when nonmovant cannot present facts 
essential to opposing summary judgment); id. at 60(b)(6) (court may reopen final judgment for “any 
other reason that justifies relief”). 
287. Clermont, supra note 177, at 1022. 
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH (2004) 
(noting myriad suggestions for implementing this rule). 
289. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(P). 
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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of preemption. Judges implementing the “other ways” and “any manner” clauses 
engage in functionally identical processes of creating common law within the 
FRCP’s constraints. If law arising from Rule 16(c)(2)(P) preempts state law in 
federal court, so does law arising from Rule 83(b). 
Of course, one might respond that neither the “any manner” nor “other ways” 
clause can preempt state law because both involve rulemaking rather than 
interpretation. But then federal orders implementing the FRCP would have 
different preemptive force based on how much express guidance the text provided 
for the outcome. Precise texts would generate preemptive interpretations while 
imprecise texts would generate non-preemptive rulemaking. There is no evidence 
that rulemakers wanted or expected this convoluted approach to preemption. Nor 
is there any practical way of distinguishing judicial orders interpreting open-ended 
texts from judicial orders exercising authority to make rules. Accordingly, the 
distinction between formal and informal rulemaking does not provide a basis for 
limiting the preemptive force of common law implementing an Any Manner clause. 
Moreover, if common law decisionmaking produces inappropriate results, 
rulemakers can intervene. Charles Clark, the reporter for the 1938 FRCP, cited this 
judicial supervision as a reason to maintain flexibility under the Any Manner 
clauses.291 He probably overestimated the likelihood of intervention by rulemakers 
given modern obstacles to shepherding amendments through the rulemaking 
process.292 But the point remains that formal rules are not a categorically superior 
alternative to common law, and the two approaches to rulemaking can work  
in tandem. 
An alternative justification for narrowly construing Any Manner clauses is that 
they might not authorize common law that does not already arise from other 
sources, such as inherent judicial power under Article III.293 On this view, the 
clauses would serve two purposes. First, the clauses would prevent litigants from 
contending that the enumeration of federal rules always forecloses the existence of 
unenumerated rules.294 Second, the clauses would “insulate district judges against 
the argument that they were required by the Conformity Act to follow state practice 
on matters not governed by the civil rules.” 295 Rule 83 does serve these purposes 
(among others), but a narrow interpretation does not follow from this conclusion. 
 
291. “Open Forum” Discussion of Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 965, 965 (1937) 
(reporting statement by Charles Clark that the standing committee could propose changes to common 
law that was “out of line”). 
292. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 120 (2017) (discussing the “stickiness of the 
rulemaking status quo”). 
293. See Barrett, supra note 52, at 837 (“[It] is not at all clear that . . . [Rule 83(b)] authorizes 
procedural common law in the sense of generally applicable rules worked out by judges on a  
case-by-case basis.”). 
294. See id. (contending that Rule 83(b) confirms the continuing legitimacy of authority that 
“the judiciary otherwise possesses”). 
295. 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at § 3155. 
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The clauses are phrased as a grant of power rather than a preservation of 
power. The Any Manner clauses tell courts what they can do—they “may regulate.” 
Other rules similarly use this “may” construction as a grant of authority.296 This 
affirmative grant of common lawmaking power in 1938 was necessary to 
circumvent the Conformity Act, which Congress did not repeal until 1948,297 and 
which would have displaced at least some federal common law.298 Moreover, if the 
Any Manner clauses merely preserved exogenous authority, one would expect them 
to say something like “nothing in these rules prevents district courts from relying 
on consistent federal law from other sources.” Several rules do in fact defer to 
extrinsic federal299 or state300 sources, but the Any Manner clauses do not. The Any 
Manner clauses’ text therefore indicates that they are a grant of rulemaking power 
rather than an acknowledgment of inherent power. Moreover, the drafting history 
discussed above eliminates any doubt about the clause’s broad delegation of 
rulemaking power.301 Delegated authority under the Any Manner clauses overlaps 
with authority that other sources—such as inherent power under Article  
III—already provide, especially after the Conformity Act was repealed. This 
redundancy is not troubling because institutional power often stems from  
overlapping sources.302 
Another potential justification for narrowly construing the Any Manner 
clauses is that the judiciary cannot augment its own power. It therefore cannot 
promulgate a rule under the REA that authorizes creating common law,303 especially 
when common law preempts state law.304 
Concerns about judicial overreaching do not undermine the Any Manner 
clauses. Congress’s delegation of power to create national rules included authority 
to address gaps in those rules. Congress could not have expected the judiciary to 
enumerate a comprehensive code. Gaps were inevitable. One rulemaker succinctly 
framed the problem: “some case is going to come up where there is no rule. What 
is the judge to do?”305 Accordingly, inherent in the REA’s delegation of rulemaking 
power to the judiciary was an acknowledgment that federal courts would need to 
apply gap-filling common law. The rulemakers therefore plausibly interpreted the 
 
296. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d) (“may” allow supplemental pleadings); id. at 16(a) (“may” 
order a pretrial conference); id. at 37(b)(2)(A) (“may” issue sanctions). 
297. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992. 
298. See 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at § 3155. 
299. See FED. R. CIV. P. 22(b) (“The remedy this rule provides is in addition to—and does not 
supersede or limit—the remedy provided [in various statutes governing interpleader].”). 
300. See FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a) (attachment); id. at 69(a) (execution). 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 254–64. 
302. See Mark D. Rosen, From Exclusivity to Concurrence, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1051 (2010). 
303. See Barrett, supra note 52, at 837 (“Congress can confer common lawmaking power on 
federal judges, but federal judges cannot confer such power on themselves.”). 
304. See Burbank, supra note 242, at 1193 n.763 (suggesting that allowing common law derived 
from Rule 83 to “displace[ ]” state law raises concerns about Rule 83’s validity under the REA). 
305. ADVISORY COMM. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 267, at 1515 (comment by Monte Lemann). 
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REA to authorize the creation of a rule governing how gap-filling would occur.306 
Rule 83 serves this function by specifying how courts should fill gaps. 
The FRCP’s drafters also had to consider what sources would supply  
gap-filling rules. Judges have only two options: state law or non-state law. State law 
was not a viable option because the REA sought to liberate federal courts from the 
Conformity Act.307 Once preemptive non-state law was selected as a gap-filler, the 
only options were general law and federal common law. Erie took general law off 
the table. Federal common law thus became the most compelling answer to an 
inevitable question about the source of interstitial rules. Accordingly, the Any 
Manner clauses are not a self-aggrandizing assertion of judicial power. Rather, the 
clauses are a reasonable interpretation of the REA’s mandate to create a 
comprehensive system of federal procedure. 
Congress’s delegation of authority to create open-ended rules does not 
impermissibly undermine the separation of powers. The Constitution precludes 
Congress from delegating excessive discretion to agencies or courts.308 However, 
the Supreme Court has only rarely invoked constitutional limits on delegation.309 
Valid delegations to the executive branch can authorize agencies to fill gaps through 
“case-by-case evolution of statutory standards” rather than “general rules.”310 The 
Court has likewise used its delegated power under the REA to promulgate catch-all 
provisions providing only marginally more guidance for adjudicative 
implementation than the Any Manner clauses.311 Facilitating this adaptation to 
unforeseen or changed circumstances is a widely recognized virtue of delegation.312 
Congress has broad discretion to deploy these adaptive mechanisms and to decide 
whether the executive or judicial branches are best suited to regulate  
particular areas.313 
 
306. See supra Section III.A.1. 
307. See supra Section III.A.1.  
308. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 436–37 (2008) (noting that the “operative question has 
to do with what Congress has given away,” rather than which institution has received  
delegated authority). 
309. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“[W]e have ‘almost 
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that 
can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”) (citation omitted). 
310. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). But cf. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,  
231–32 (1974) (holding that gap-filling cannot occur in an “ad hoc” manner). Agencies may also issue 
informal guidance that has the practical effect of filling gaps in regulations, although informal guidance 
may be inappropriate when it resembles a new rule but circumvents formal notice-and-comment 
procedures. See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 502–09 (2013) 
(considering how administrative law principles should apply to guidance documents). 
311. See supra text accompanying notes 286–91 (discussing FRCP 16 and 42). 
312. See, e.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1585–86 
(2016); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
517 (1989). 
313. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the 
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006) (analyzing how Congress chooses 
where to delegate authority). 
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Given that Congress imposed guiding conditions on its delegation—such as 
the requirement that rules must not “modify any substantive right”314—the  
gap-filling Any Manner clauses should survive scrutiny under the nondelegation 
doctrine.315 The REA offers at least as much guidance as its vague predecessors 
dating back to 1789.316 In contrast, legislative delegation of authority to courts 
implementing common law statutes may raise more significant nondelegation 
concerns than delegation of gap-filling power under the Any Manner clauses. Both 
kinds of delegations rely on the judiciary’s capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Stare decisis may limit this flexibility—and thus remove a rationale 
for delegation—when the Court implements substantive statutes,317 while 
procedural common law is relatively malleable. 
Although nondelegation concerns do not affect the prioritization inquiry, they 
may affect the interpretation inquiry. The fact that delegating common law powers 
to courts is constitutional does not mean that common law rules are wise for every 
occasion. Accordingly, Part IV notes the need for an “Erie canon” governing the 
scope of federal procedural common law. Courts must be wary of broadly 
interpreting federal common law rules to displace state law. In some circumstances, 
a federal common law rule might appropriately apply in federal question cases but 
not in diversity cases, or in federal courts but not state courts.318 
 
314. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018). 
315. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[A] certain degree of 
discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.”) (citation omitted); 
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1994) 
(suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine should acknowledge “the well-recognized distinction 
between legislating and gap-filling”). Nondelegation might also be less of a concern in the context of 
procedural rulemaking because of the nexus between the Any Manner clauses and the judiciary’s 
“inherent power” to manage litigation. See Alexander Volokh, Judicial Non-Delegation, the Inherent 
Powers Corollary, and Federal Common Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 1391, 1420 (2017). The Any Manner clauses 
also do not constitute a “redelegation” of legislative power from the Supreme Court to lower courts 
because the Court retains a supervisory role in the common law’s development. F. Andrew Hessick  
& Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 168 (2013) 
(contending that “when Congress unambiguously delegates policy-making power to a particular agent, 
only that agent may exercise the delegated power”). 
316. See Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (authorizing the Court to “regulate 
the whole practice” of lower courts in admiralty, equity, and common law cases “to prevent delays . . . 
promote brevity and succinctness . . . and abolish all unnecessary costs”); Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22,  
§ 7, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (authorizing federal courts to promulgate rules governing certain specified topics 
“as shall be fit and necessary for the advancement of justice, and especially to that end to prevent delays 
in proceedings”); Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (specifying rules “subject however to 
such alterations and additions as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or 
to such regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by 
rule to prescribe”); Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83 (authorizing federal courts to 
“establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business [sic]”). 
317. See Lemos, supra note 308, at 454. 
318. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. Some scholars have criticized this asymmetrical 
approach, see Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89  
WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 125 (2011), but it is a necessary consequence of the interpretation inquiry when 
rulemakers carefully circumscribe federal law’s scope. 
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Another argument for narrowly interpreting Rule 83 posits that the REA’s 
authorization of “general” rules imposes a transsubstantivity requirement.319 
Common law rulemaking might result in different rules for different kinds of claims 
and therefore would exceed the statutory delegation.320 
Concerns about transsubstantivity do not require narrowly interpreting the 
Any Manner clauses. First, the clauses on their face are transsubstantive. They 
authorize common law rules but say nothing about tailoring these rules to the 
substance of particular claims. Second, to the extent that the Any Manner clauses 
facilitate case-by-case tailoring of process to substance, the departure from 
transsubstantivity should be welcome (within limits). Procedure implements 
substantive law. A transsubstantive procedural code prevents arbitrary 
decisionmaking but can also stifle the flexibility that is necessary to enforce the wide 
range of substantive laws that courts encounter. Building case-by-case discretion 
into formal rules is a sensible way to capture the benefits of both transsubstantivity 
and substantive tailoring,321 assuming that a healthy equilibrium is possible.322 Third, 
the REA may not require enforcing transsubstantivity at the level of gap-filling 
common law. As noted in Section III.A.2, the REA’s drafters must have known that 
gap-filling would be necessary. The FRCP’s drafters in turn expressly embraced 
adjudication’s ability to adapt rules to case-specific circumstances. The REA’s 
preference for “general” transsubstantive rules therefore might apply only to formal 
written rules, and not to the inevitable gap-filling common law that by definition 
addresses idiosyncratic issues. Finally, even if common law must be “general,” the 
REA would at most prevent judges from using their delegated Any Manner 
authority to craft subject-specific rules. Judges could still exercise their delegated 
authority to craft generally applicable rules. 
 
319. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).  
320. See Rules Enabling Act of 1985: Hearing on H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 27 (1985) 
(letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 27, 1984)) 
(“the last sentence” of Rule 83, before the 1995 amendments, “is not a ‘general rule’”). 
321. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (“There are, indeed, trans-substantive values which may be expressed, and 
to some extent served, by a code of procedure. But there are also demands of particular substantive 
objectives which cannot be served except through the purposeful shaping, indeed, the manipulation, of 
process to a case or to an area of law.”); Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 786 (2017) (noting need for an occasional “ad hoc procedural fix”). But cf. Robert 
G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural 
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 930 (1999) (“[A] rulemaking system designed to achieve efficiency should 
place limited reliance on case-specific discretion . . . . Broad discretion generates high administrative 
and litigation costs with questionable efficiency benefits, impedes the solution of collective action 
problems, and frustrates the use of credible threats to achieve regulatory objectives.”). 
322. For a discussion of when substantive exceptions to transsubstantive norms may be 
appropriate, see David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013  
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1191, 1236–50. 
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Another argument for narrowly interpreting the Any Manner clauses is that 
they are severely constrained by a bar against disadvantaging parties without prior 
notice. The sentence following the Any Manner Clause in FRCP 83(b) states that: 
No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance 
with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district 
rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case 
with actual notice of the requirement.323 
Similar language exists in other rules containing Any Manner Clauses.324 One 
could therefore argue that although the clauses authorize the creation of gap-filling 
common law, that law is unenforceable if it creates a material “disadvantage.” 
However, this argument is not plausible given the drafting history of the “no 
sanction or other disadvantage” clauses. The clauses were added in 1995 to address 
problems associated with “internal operating procedures, standing orders, and other 
internal directives” that were often inaccessible to lawyers.325 The amendment’s 
clear target was generally applicable written codes, not gap-filling common law. And 
the amendment’s clear purpose was to prevent courts from punishing lawyers or 
parties from deviating from the court’s preestablished yet unknown expectations. 
The rulemakers’ primary concern seemed to have focused on “standing orders.”326 
There is also no indication that the word “disadvantage” was intended to do 
anything more than backstop the word “sanction” if a penalty that resembled a 
sanction was not technically a sanction. The reference in 1995 to a “disadvantage” 
arising from an inaccessible written code therefore did not alter judicial power to 
create gap-filling common law, which had existed for sixty years and which the 
FRCP’s original drafters thought was essential. 
A final challenge suggests that broad interpretations of Rule 83(b) conflict 
with Rule 83(a)’s authorization of formal local rules for individual federal districts.327 
Unlike Any Manner rules, local rules require public notice and comment.328 If the 
Any Manner clauses are read broadly, then they provide an opportunity for judges 
to circumvent notice-and-comment rulemaking. That result seems troubling given 
the REA’s emphasis on transparency and public deliberation.329 
 
323. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). 
324. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b); FED. R. APP. P. 47(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 8026(b), 9029(b). 
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) advisory committee notes to 1995 amendment. 
326. Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Robert  
E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Attachment 1 at 3  
(May 17, 1993), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV5-1993.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8592-YKM7] (noting that the committee’s “concerns” were “similar” to those 
underlying a related amendment to ensure that “negligent failure to comply with a local rule imposing 
a requirement of form should not be enforced in a manner to cause a party to lose any of its rights”); 
see also Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 9 (Apr. 28–29, 1994), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV04-1994-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/3M9E-
JH72] (“The discussion of proposed Rule 83(b) focused on the question whether it might be possible 
to do something more effective to restrict or eliminate standing orders.”).
327. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a). 
328. See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a). 
329. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b)–(f) (2018). But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (2018) (authorizing judicial 
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Conflict between the Any Manner clauses and local rulemaking procedures is 
not a reason to interpret the clauses narrowly. 
First, rulemakers anticipated this conflict and preferred case-by-case 
adjudication over local rulemaking. For example, Edward Tolman thought that 
formal local rules “may impair the useful power” that the Any Manner clauses 
provide.330 He observed that: 
Now, how much better it is to omit the drafting of rules for some unknown 
and unknowable thing that may or may not occur and to give the trial court, 
aided by counsel on both sides, the right to work out the unforeseen 
procedural problems as they arise and handle them then and there, in 
accordance with the circumstances that accompany and surround them.331 
Similarly, William Mitchell was concerned that “meticulous” local rules would 
undermine the “flexibility” that common law would otherwise afford.332 Subsequent 
developments have confirmed Mitchell’s doubts because local rules often create 
unnecessary confusion and inefficiency.333 
Even the committee charged with planning implementation of local rules was 
skeptical about their value. Its report observed that Rule 83’s Any Manner clause 
was “very significant” and emphasized “the discretion of the trial judge,” leaving a 
limited role for local rules.334 
Second, as noted above, the Any Manner clauses recognize the inevitability of 
gaps that notice-and-comment rulemaking cannot fill. Accordingly, neither national 
nor local formal rules are viable alternatives to the Any Manner clauses. 
In sum, FCL should not be viewed as circumventing the local rules process. 
Instead, FCL provides a favorable alternative to local rules that is consistent with 
text, policy, and historical expectations. 
3. The Any Manner Clauses Erase the Line Between Formal Rules and Common Law 
Animating the Current Prioritization Inquiry 
The Any Manner clauses should obliterate Hanna. Judicial decisions 
implementing the Any Manner clauses through federal common law have the same 
preemptive force as decisions implementing other federal rules. This equal 
preemptive force leaves no bifurcation for Hanna to exploit. The “unguided” prong 
ceases to exist for all cases enforcing the Any Manner Clauses. More generally, as 
 
councils in each circuit to “modify or abrogate” local rules promulgated under § 2071 that are 
inconsistent with national rules promulgated under § 2072). 
330. WASHINGTON PROCEEDINGS, supra note 255, at 129 (statement of Edgar Tolman). 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 232 (statement of William Mitchell). 
333. See Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 929, 1006 (1996) (“Unrestrained localism in the federal courts is mischief serving no purpose that 
Congress can honorably embrace.”). 
334. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON LOCAL DISTRICT COURT RULES 9–10 (1940). 
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noted in the next section, the unguided prong also ceases to exist for all other forms 
of preemptive federal common law. 
Accordingly, the current two-pronged approach to prioritization, featuring a 
fuzzy test for federal common law and automatic priority for all other types of 
federal law, collapses. What should rise in its place is an exercise in preemption. 
Valid interpretations of valid federal rules—whether or not labeled  
“judge-made”—preempt state law on matters within their scope. If there is doubt 
about whether some types of federal common law—such as federal equitable 
remedies335—can preempt state law, those doubts do not require considering the 
“twin aims” test. Instead, the relevant questions are whether federal courts can 
create these suspect forms of federal common law and if so how the Supremacy 
Clause treats them. 
Jettisoning Hanna at first seems to raise disturbing federalism and separation 
of powers concerns. Allowing procedural common law to preempt state law in 
federal court would permit unelected federal judges to undermine interests that may 
be very important to states.336 
However, eliminating Hanna does not remove federalism and separation of 
powers issues from the Erie calculus. Instead, this Article’s framework shifts the 
policy battleground from the priority inquiry to the interpretation inquiry. Judges 
would still have power to interpret the scope of FCL narrowly so that it yields to 
conflicting state law in appropriate circumstances. In contrast, the “twin aims” 
inquiry does not focus on identifying circumstances warranting interpretive 
deference. Instead, the twin aims test relies on arbitrary distinctions  
and categorizations. 
A virtue of spotlighting the interpretation inquiry while simplifying the 
prioritization inquiry is that the policy choices confronting judges become clearer. 
This is not simply a shell game in which a question that previously arose under one 
doctrinal label reappears under another. Instead, the question emerges in sharper 
focus through the use of a more refined lens. Embracing this lens would help judges 
to better understand their role, the tools at their disposal, and the relevant 
constitutional values. Part IV explores options confronting judges. 
A complication arises from potential differences between the judiciary’s 
inherent authority under Article III and its authority under the Any Manner Clauses. 
 
335. See supra notes 52, 157 (discussing competing characterizations of federal judicial authority 
to create and apply equitable remedies). 
336. See Steinman, supra note 281, at 1152–53 (noting policy arguments against giving 
procedural FCL preemptive force). Steinman frames his concern about excessive preemption as 
relevant to Erie’s prioritization inquiry. See id. I share his concern, but think it implicates Erie’s 
interpretation inquiry, which governs whether an otherwise applicable federal rule is “deep enough” to 
preempt state law. Id. at 1148. Analogous concerns about the FRCP’s preemptive force could also 
implicate the creation inquiry if there is a compelling argument that some federal rules violate the REA’s 
prohibition against modifying substantive rights. See Steinman, supra note 64, at 296–97 (questioning 
application of federal pleading, summary judgment, and class certification standards to state law claims). 
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This complication does not salvage Hanna, but might inform efforts to apply the 
prioritization inquiry. 
First, a gap may exist between the federal judiciary’s inherent power and its 
power under the Any Manner clauses. The Any Manner clauses include statutorily 
and self-imposed constraints that might not limit the “judicial Power” under Article 
III. For example, Article III may grant some quasi-substantive authority that the 
REA withholds (including in cases involving equitable remedies),337 and it may 
authorize common law venue rules that are beyond the FRCP’s scope.338 If so, 
federal courts could invoke Article III to achieve results beyond what the Any 
Manner clauses authorize. Analyzing the extent of inherent judicial power to 
manage federal litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.339 For present 
purposes, what matters is simply the possibility that inherent power is broader than 
rulemaking authority under the Any Manner clauses. 
Second, common law implementing the Any Manner clauses may have greater 
preemptive force than common law arising from inherent judicial power. The Any 
Manner clauses may benefit from a statutory supersession clause that preempts state 
law.340 Exercises of inherent power to police federal litigation do not have a similar 
congressional imprimatur. Whether the absence of legislative approval limits the 
judiciary’s authority to create preemptive procedural common law is another 
question beyond the scope of this Article. But again, the possibility may  
create complications. 
The foregoing two points suggest that courts addressing conflicts between 
federal and state law may need to know whether a common law rule arises under an 
Any Manner clause or inherent power. This question is irrelevant under Hanna. It 
would become relevant if some FCL is valid only under Article III and if it therefore 
has less preemptive force (which is an issue on which I take no position). The 
prioritization inquiry should therefore pay close attention to the source of FCL 
rules. This emphasis on sources is consistent with Erie, which focused on identifying 
the origins of governing law. 
Part IV addresses additional factors that should shape a new priority rule. 
 
337. See discussion supra notes 52, 157. 
338. See infra Section III.B (discussing the enigmatic origins of forum non conveniens doctrine). 
339. For analysis of the federal judiciary’s inherent power, see Barrett, supra note 52; Stephen 
B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677,  
1681–88 (2004); Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional 
Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
1291 (1986); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 
86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001). 
340. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24. 
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B. Outside the Enabling Act Context, Relying on a Distinction Between Federal Common 
Law and Other Sources of Federal Law Marginalizes Salient Policy Questions About 
Federal Common Law’s Validity, Scope, and Effect 
The problem discussed in Section A is not unique to the REA context. 
Whenever federal courts apply rules that resemble common law, questions arise 
about how to characterize what the court is doing. Is it interpreting law or creating 
law? Is it exercising inherent authority or delegated authority? What is the source of 
that authority? What policies animate that authority, and do they favor broad or 
narrow assertions of federal power? The current prioritization inquiry overlooks 
these questions, leading to an arbitrary test. 
1. Example: Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
Forum non conveniens doctrine (FNC) permits federal district courts to 
dismiss cases when venue would be more appropriate in another country.341 The 
FNC doctrine is controversial.342 A nuanced account of Erie’s distinct inquiries 
helps to frame the debate and suggest pathways to resolving contested questions. 
Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly authorizes FNC 
dismissals. Statutes provide standards for determining when venue is proper and 
allow transfers between federal districts.343 But federal statutes are silent about the 
propriety of dismissing cases when a foreign forum is preferable. The FRCP are 
also silent. Rule 82 states that “[t]hese rules do not extend or limit . . . venue.”344 
Rule 83(b) must in turn respect Rule 82’s venue exclusion. Judicial authority to 
enforce FNC therefore cannot rely on the Any Manner clause. 
Given that FNC does not stem from express language in the Constitution, a 
statute, or a delegated rule, questions arise about its source and nature. Doctrine 
might be either a form of constitutional interpretation, an example of general law 
that predates and survived the Constitution, or a species of federal common law. 
An added complication is that Congress implicitly acquiesced to FNC when it 
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which authorizes transfer among federal districts. 
Section 1404(a) “revis[ed]” and “codif[ied]” FNC for cases within the statute’s 
scope,345 but did not expressly abrogate the remaining portions of FNC doctrine 
despite the opportunity to do so.346 
The Supreme Court has not committed to a particular characterization of 
FNC. It has variously treated FNC as a “residual doctrine” predating and filling 
 
341. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at § 3828. 
342. See Emily J. Derr, Striking a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 819, 821 (2008) (“Many scholars condemn the forum non conveniens doctrine 
as ‘arbitrary,’ ‘incoherent,’ abused, and even ‘unconstitutional.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
343. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391–1413 (2018). 
344. FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
345. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). 
346. Cf. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987) (noting that congressional 
acquiescence to the FRCP adds to the Court’s confidence in their validity). 
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gaps in the venue statutes,347 a form of abstention invoking judicial power “to 
decline jurisdiction,”348 an implementation of public policies governing the 
allocation of judicial business,349 a “doctrine based on fairness,”350 an example of 
“inherent power,”351 a “common-law doctrine,”352 and a “federal common-law 
venue rule (so to speak).”353 The Court also called FNC a “supervening venue 
provision,”354 raising the unanswered question: Provision of what? 
Justice Frankfurter referred to FNC more majestically as a “manifestation[ ] of 
a civilized judicial system” that is “firmly imbedded in our law.”355 The mechanism 
by which FNC became imbedded remains a mystery. Indeed, the Court has 
identified only where FNC does not come from. It held that FNC “neither 
originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application there. To the contrary, it is and 
has long been a doctrine of general application.”356 The opinion did not state why 
this long application was justified. A subsequent opinion reaffirmed FNC’s 
“traditional” reliance on a “broad[ ] range of considerations” without explaining the 
doctrine’s historical origin or modern foundation.357 
Apparently, FNC is a doctrinal analog to celebrities who are famous for being 
famous. It coasts on its reputation even though the Court cannot explain its 
ascension or persistence. 
The Court has repeatedly avoided questions about FNC’s priority under Erie. 
Four decisions expressly noted the prioritization problem when FNC issues arose 
in diversity cases. The Court declined to address prioritization because federal and 
state law were consistent.358 These assertions of consistency are dubious. The Court 
elsewhere admitted that the “discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with 
the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application . . . make [national] 
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.”359 Given this 
 
347. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 61 (2013). 
348. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947); see also Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566  
U.S. 189, 207 (2012) (including FNC in a list of abstention doctrines based on “comity”). 
349. See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508. 
350. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. v. O’Connor, 439 U.S. 1034, 1037 (1978). 
351. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 438 n.1 (1996). 
352. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 n.20 (1985). 
353. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994). 
354. Id. 
355. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
356. Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 450. 
357. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722–23 (1996). 
358. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (holding that state and 
federal law were “virtually identical” so “we need not resolve the Erie question”); Gulf Oil  
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (stating that addressing prioritization “would not be 
profitable” given similarity between federal and state law); Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 
330 U.S. 518, 530 (1947) (observing that federal FNC doctrine was consistent with state law, “if 
applicable”); Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 559 (1946) (stating that Court would 
“reserve decision” on the Erie question because federal and state law were consistent). But cf. Chick 
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 148 (1988) (holding that FNC dismissal in federal court did 
not preclude state court from subsequently applying its own FNC doctrine in the same case). 
359. Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 455. 
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extensive discretion and complexity, even small differences between state and 
federal precedent could produce different outcomes. 
Optimistic assumptions that state and federal courts would consistently reach 
the same FNC result may reflect a desire to avoid the implications of inconsistency. 
If state and federal FNC rules differ in a diversity case, then prioritization is 
necessary. Prioritization would be tricky under current law. The Court in another 
context labeled FNC as a doctrine “of procedure rather than substance.”360 But that 
label elides several practical implications of venue that affect priority.361 Relevant 
questions under current Hanna jurisprudence include whether FNC promotes 
forum shopping, whether it is integrated with a state’s remedial scheme, and the 
nature and significance of policies that animate it.362 Lower courts have answered 
these questions in a way that favors federal priority, but scholars are divided.363 I 
take a different approach, as I think these questions about priority are not  
worth asking. 
The three questions about FNC that should be most important implicate three 
distinct components of Erie. First, why do federal courts have authority to enforce 
FNC? This is the question under Erie’s creation inquiry. Second, what is the scope 
of FNC in diversity cases; i.e., do federal courts have a reason for enforcing a version 
of FNC that conflicts with state law? This is the question under Erie’s interpretation 
inquiry. Third, what is the status of FNC under the Supremacy Clause? This is the 
question that I contend should constitute Erie’s prioritization inquiry. 
Answering these questions would produce valuable insights. If the Court takes 
Erie’s creation inquiry seriously, it would need to explain what sources of law justify 
FNC dismissals. The Court could not simply call FNC a “provision” of “general 
applicability.” This loose language treats FNC as the sort of “brooding 
omnipresence” that Erie condemned.364 Likewise, a rigorous interpretation inquiry 
would directly confront contested policy questions animating FNC by asking why 
it should have a broad scope. Perhaps it should apply only to a narrow category of 
cases. Or perhaps FNC should not exist at all.365 Finally, if FNC is valid and 
encompasses a disputed issue, invoking the Supremacy Clause asks the question that 
the Constitution itself says is important: Is FNC preemptive? 
Once we have answers to the three foregoing questions, the Hanna inquiry 
becomes pointless. Some of the Hanna questions will have already been addressed. 
For example, if FNC promotes vertical forum shopping, then courts might have a 
reason to narrow its scope. Other Hanna questions would be irrelevant. For 
 
360. Id. at 453. 
361. See Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (1991) (noting that 
venue changes can have “enormous impact on the litigants even though they may not necessarily affect 
the underlying claim”). 
362. See supra Section II.B.4.b. 
363. See Lear, supra note 52, at 1198–1202 (surveying decisions and scholarship). 
364. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945). 
365. See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390 (2017) 
(advocating elimination of federal FNC). 
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example, whether FNC is substantive or procedural tells us little about its origins, 
breadth, and status under the content-neutral Supremacy Clause. 
2. Extrapolating Beyond Forum Non Conveniens 
The FNC example is a good proxy for thinking about all federal common law. 
All federal doctrines that resemble common law raise similar kinds of creation and 
interpretation questions as FNC: When Congress is silent about the role of state law 
in a regulatory regime, under what circumstances can federal courts create  
gap-filling rules, procedures, and remedies?366 When is interstitial common law a 
form of interpretation and when is it judge-made law?367 Which common law 
doctrines are “general” law and which are “federal” law?368 Do various nominally 
procedural FCL rules have a broad scope that encompasses claims arising under 
state law or a narrow scope that excludes them?369 These and other questions 
directly address the separation of powers and federalism issues at Erie’s core. In 
contrast, Hanna’s questions require a distracting and ultimately pointless detour. 
IV. RECOGNIZING THE FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING CURRENT 
PRIORITIZATION DOCTRINE CAN LEAD TO A MORE REFINED APPLICATION OF 
ERIE THAT HIGHLIGHTS SALIENT CONCERNS ABOUT FEDERALISM AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Synthesizing the points developed in Parts I through III permits a more 
refined implementation of the Erie doctrine. It also suggests several avenues for 
further scholarship. Indeed, this Article shows that several ostensibly distinct 
literatures actually address loosely connected threads of Erie. Highlighting these 
hidden connections can add new dimensions to the understanding of each area. 
 
366. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (“silence [about 
choice of law] in federal legislation is no reason for limiting the reach of federal law” because “interstitial 
federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts”). 
367. Compare Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948) (holding that a longstanding 
common law rule “has become part of the warp and woof of the legislation”), with id. at 465 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s rule as relying on common law rather than a statute). 
368. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“It seems fair to 
assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided 
Erie . . . .”). 
369. Compare Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (holding that filing a 
complaint in a manner proscribed by federal law does not toll the statute of limitations in a diversity 
case), with West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (reaching the opposite conclusion in a federal question 
case). The Court’s answers to these questions about the content of federal law are not always 
convincing, perhaps due to confusion about how to implement the Erie doctrine’s four distinct 
inquiries. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and 
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 702 (1988) (stating that West’s departure from Walker 
relies on “sleight of hand that still leaves me blinking”). 
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A. The Prioritization Inquiry Should Implement the Supremacy Clause Rather than the 
“Twin Aims” Test and Therefore Will Be Relatively Simple in Most Cases 
As Part I explained, prioritization issues arise only after the Court has applied 
the creation and interpretation inquiries. Moreover, the interpretation inquiry 
considers whether the relevant federal rule incorporates deference to conflicting 
sources of law.370 Thus, by the time the prioritization inquiry arises, judges know 
that: (1) a federal institution with regulatory authority has created a valid rule; (2) 
this rule encompasses the relevant facts; (3) there is no policy or textual reason to 
read the rule narrowly; (4) there is no express or implied basis for deference to 
another regulator; and (5) state law conflicts with the federal rule. The federal court 
must therefore decide how to resolve the conflict. 
Part II explained that the Constitution itself answers the question about how 
to resolve conflicts between federal and state law. Valid federal law is supreme on 
matters within its scope without qualification or exception. The Supremacy Clause 
does not have “twin aims” that limit its preemptive force. There are no fuzzy 
“equitable federalism” values to balance.371 Federal law displaces all inconsistent 
state law. The only open question is: What kinds of rules fit within the Clause’s 
definition of supreme law? That question has settled answers for the Constitution, 
statutes, self-executing treaties, and delegated rules. Current prioritization doctrine 
recognizes the preemptive effect of these sources, although it often does not frame 
the inquiry in terms of preemption and supremacy.372 But FCL presents a more 
difficult problem. 
The interesting Erie question about FCL’s priority should be whether the 
Supremacy Clause makes FCL supreme. Supremacy is clear when the Constitution, 
a statute, or a treaty federalizes an issue without providing a rule. In that scenario, 
federal and state law cannot conflict because state law cannot apply. FCL is all that 
remains to fill the gap. In contrast, when a supreme source of federal law does not 
clearly preempt state law, conflicts between FCL and state law may raise more 
difficult prioritization questions.373 
Instead of asking relevant questions about FCL’s status, Hanna asks tangential 
questions. As Part III showed, Hanna’s approach relies on a flawed understanding 
of FCL in the REA context as well as in other contexts. Moreover, there is no basis 
in the Erie decision for thinking that the Supremacy Clause suddenly ceases to be 
relevant when FCL conflicts with state law. Erie did not consider FCL’s priority 
because the case did not involve FCL. Instead, Erie considered whether a federal 
court could invoke “general law” untethered to either state or federal lawmaking 
 
370. See supra Section I.B. 
371. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988) (holding that weighing competing state interests 
“has no place under our Supremacy Clause analysis”). 
372. See supra notes 73–75 (noting that the Supreme Court’s vertical choice-of-law 
jurisprudence sometimes cites Erie, sometimes cites preemption doctrine, and sometimes cites both). 
373. See supra note 153 (noting competing interpretations of the Supremacy Clause); supra notes 
157–58 (discussing federal equitable remedies and customary international law). 
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authority.374 Erie’s rejection of general law under the creation inquiry says nothing 
about the preemptive effect of valid FCL under the prioritization inquiry. Moreover, 
the Court confirmed soon after Erie that “federal supremacy” dictated the 
application of FCL and that “this is not at all a matter to be decided by application 
of the Erie rule.”375 
In sum, Erie’s prioritization inquiry entails considering whether federal law 
preempts state law. Determining FCL’s priority requires analyzing its foundation 
and its status under the Supremacy Clause. In contrast, Hanna’s misguided inquiry 
considers questions that the Supremacy Clause does not ask. 
B. Deemphasizing the Prioritization Inquiry Would Highlight Important Questions Under 
the Creation and Interpretation Inquiries About the Validity and Scope of Federal Law 
FCL raises difficult Erie issues under both this Article’s framework and 
current law. The difference is that this Article’s framework requires courts to 
address difficult questions directly by grounding these questions in the most 
relevant constitutional inquiries. The forum non conveniens discussion in Section 
III.B used a concrete example to illustrate the benefits of shifting emphasis from 
prioritization to creation and interpretation. This Section places those benefits in a 
more abstract context by considering values that preemption implicates. It then 
explains how revitalized creation and interpretation inquiries would intersect with 
several ostensibly distinct lines of scholarship. 
1. Hanna Obscures Policy Questions About Preemption that the Creation and 
Interpretation Inquiries Directly Address 
The prospect of federal preemption typically raises four concerns. The first 
two implicate the Constitution’s structure and the second two involve related 
questions of policy. First, a federalism concern arises from the federal government’s 
limited powers. Preemption is troubling when the federal government injects itself 
into a domain where it does not belong and excludes a state from exercising its 
“reserved” authority.376 Second, a separation of powers concern arises because each 
federal institution has only limited power. Preemption is troubling when one of 
these institutions exercises authority that belongs to a different institution.377 Third, 
even when the federal government has authority to preempt state law, deference 
may be an appropriate policy.378 Fourth, even if a particular federal institution has 
authority to create preemptive rules, policy arguments may favor action by a 
different federal institution. For example, scholars have debated the extent to which 
 
374. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). 
375. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309–10 (1947). 
376. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
377. See supra note 153 (noting disagreement about when judge-made law, in contrast to statutes, 
can preempt state law). 
378. See Hart, supra note 13, at 526 (“In wide areas . . . state law continues to operate not by 
virtue of the Tenth Amendment but by virtue only of the non-exercise of latent federal powers”). 
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Congress and the judiciary may have solicitude for and the capacity to protect state 
interests.379 These four concerns posit that over-preemption is undesirable.  
Under-preemption raises countervailing concerns, as federal institutions must 
vigorously protect federal authority in appropriate cases.380 Accordingly, both  
over- and under-preemption are controversial for reasons of constitutional structure 
and public policy. 
Erie’s creation and interpretation inquiries directly address the reasons that 
preemption is controversial. The creation inquiry enforces structural limits on the 
power of federal institutions. The interpretation inquiry incorporates policy 
preferences about the proper scope of federal law when multiple governments 
regulate the same field.381 Courts formulating FCL use the same adjudicative 
process both to create rules and determine their scope in particular cases. This 
flexibility leaves courts free to incorporate concerns about preemption into both 
the rulemaking and rule-application calculus.382 
The interpretation inquiry subsumes factors in Hanna and places them in a 
more appropriate context. For example, a court applying Hanna asks whether an 
FCL rule would lead to inequitable administration of state law. If the answer is yes, 
the court balances that concern against competing factors.383 This approach takes 
for granted that the FCL rule leads to inequity. Yet the federal courts created the 
putatively inequitable rule and have authority to adjust its scope. If the rule as 
currently constructed is inequitable, then the interpretation inquiry may have gone 
awry. Considering inequity at the interpretation stage rather than the prioritization 
stage highlights that there is still time to improve the rule. Similarly, if an FCL rule 
does not promote the kind of important federal values that influence the “twin 
aims” inquiry, then perhaps the rule should be construed narrowly to avoid a 
conflict with state law. Conversely, if a particular interpretation of an FCL rule 
serves important federal interests, characterizing the rule as inequitable under Hanna 
seems myopic. 
 
379. Compare Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000), with Bradford R. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327 (2001). 
380. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (“[T]he government of the 
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action . . . . It is the government of 
all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all . . . . The nation, on those subjects 
on which it can act, must necessarily bind its component parts.”). 
381. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory  
Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 120 
(2018) (discussing “federalism canons”). 
382. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 n.69 
(1974) (noting importance of concurrently considering FCL’s validity and preemptive scope). For an 
example of an interpretation inquiry informed by preemption concerns, see William James 
Seidleck, Anti-SLAPP Statutes and the Federal Rules: Why Preemption Analysis Shows They Should 
Apply in Federal Diversity Suits, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 547 (2018). 
383. See supra Section II.B.4.b. 
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In sum, an FCL rule’s undesirable consequences might provide a reason for 
the judiciary to reconsider its choices regarding creation and interpretation, rather 
than a reason to question the rule’s priority. 
2. Spotlighting the Creation and Interpretation Inquiries Illuminates Problems Underlying 
Several Ostensibly Distinct Literatures 
Simplifying the prioritization inquiry and amplifying the creation and 
interpretation inquiries would have several implications for future scholarship. The 
diverse range of affected literatures highlights the often hidden reach of Erie’s 
tendrils. This Section briefly highlights fruitful questions to pursue regarding the 
role of substantive canons, the distinction between lawmaking and interpretation, 
the legitimacy of FCL, and the distinction between substance and procedure. 
a. Substantive Canons 
A growing literature addresses “substantive canons” in statutory 
interpretation.384 These canons are default rules that allow judges to skew 
interpretation toward a default policy preference when a statute’s text is not clear. 
An implication of this Article is that Hanna invented a substantive canon 
masquerading as a prioritization rule. The “twin aims” test essentially is a tool for 
deeming federal law not to apply in certain circumstances. But the test is destined 
to be unsatisfying because although it functions as a canon, it was not designed to 
be a canon.385 Reframing the prioritization inquiry in terms of preemption would 
allow courts and commentators to develop Erie canons on a clean slate.386 
Erie canons could address questions animating Erie’s four inquiries. Each 
question raises unique issues. Nevertheless, analyzing related questions as a bundle 
may reveal common themes about separation of powers and federalism that could 
shape how canons operate. Examples of questions that Erie canons could consider 
include whether courts should: interpret federal law to avoid or embrace conflicts 
with state law,387 interpret federal rules to avoid potential invalidity under the 
 
384. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 832 
(2017) (summarizing and empirically testing views about the canons’ role in interpretation). 
385. Kim Roosevelt has persuasively argued that judges considering whether FCL preempts 
state law must make a “policy decision” drawing on values animating the federal system. Roosevelt, 
supra note 33, at 36. He frames this policy decision as implicating FCL’s priority rather than its scope. 
See id. I agree that policy matters but think that Hanna’s untethered analysis illustrates why policy 
decisions should fall within Erie’s creation and interpretation inquiries rather than its  
prioritization inquiry. 
386. See Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Starting Points: The Potential Role of Default Rules in Structuring 
Choice of Law Analysis, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 125, 146–50 (2013) (discussing rationale for a potential 
Erie canon). 
387. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219 (1997) (“[W]e must decide whether the application 
of state law . . . would conflict with, and thereby significantly threaten, a federal policy or interest.”); 
Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1153 (2011) (suggesting that 
Erie creates a policy discouraging application of federal procedural law that would conflict with 
otherwise applicable state law); Sherry, supra note 76, at 1228 (advocating consideration of an 
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REA,388 interpret federal statutes to obviate federal common law addressing the 
same subject,389 and incorporate or reject state law when determining the content 
of federal common law.390 
A canon is likely to be more rigorous and legitimate if courts directly confront 
its animating policies. Developing Erie canons—and refining canons that already 
exist—in tandem would facilitate a reflective approach to lawmaking that is missing 
from modern doctrine’s haphazard evolution.391 
An Erie canon addressing whether federal courts should avoid or embrace 
conflicts with state law would overlap with existing canons addressing 
preemption.392 This overlap confirms my point that “Erie” and “preemption” are 
labels obscuring similarities among a constellation of problems. Dispensing with 
labels reveals a single core question: If federal and state law potentially conflict, 
when should courts interpret federal law broadly to protect federal interests from 
state interference, and when should courts interpret federal law narrowly to defend 
state interests from federal interference? Interpretive methods in the preemption 
and prioritization contexts should converge rather than remain in separate silos. 
b. Lawmaking versus Interpretation 
Erie predated modern theories of interpretation analyzing the gray area 
between a text’s express dictates and the outer limits of what the text authorizes. 
FCL often exists within this zone of statutory or constitutional uncertainty. From 
 
“unarticulated federal interest in the [federal] Rule itself or in applying it uniformly” against a 
“background presumption that state law applies” in diversity cases); Joshua P. Zoffer, An Avoidance 
Canon for Erie: Using Federalism to Resolve Shady Grove’s Conflicts Analysis Problem, 128 YALE  
L.J. 482 (2018) (noting the importance of developing an Erie canon and proposing a canon to avoid 
conflicts between federal and state law); citations supra note 130. 
388. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999) (adopting “limiting construction” 
of an FRCP provision in part to “minimize[ ] potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act”). 
389. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011) (distinguishing 
interpretive inquiries governing when a federal statute preempts state law and when it displaces FCL); 
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (stating presumption that FCL should not fill 
gaps in a “comprehensive” statute); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (noting 
reluctance to interpret statutes as limiting the judiciary’s “inherent power” to police litigation); City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (majority and dissent disagreed about whether a statute 
displaced preexisting FCL). 
390. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (noting “presumption that 
state law should be incorporated into federal common law”); cf. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 
374 (1980) (noting that Erie’s “spirit” favors respecting state law while implementing federal law). 
391. Of course, reflection does not necessarily produce incontestable results, especially in 
difficult cases. For recent discussions of how legal norms and methods constrain interpretation while 
preserving discretion, see William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130  
HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017); Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523 
(2018). Canons can also devolve into an implementation of “freestanding federalism” that divorces 
constitutional analysis from the “bargains and tradeoffs that made their way into” the Constitution’s 
text. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122  
HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2008 (2009). 
392. See citations supra note 91. 
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competing perspectives, some forms of FCL—especially gap-filling rules and 
remedies—can resemble either an effort to interpret a text or to create rules that are 
independent from the text.393 
The distinction between interpretation and lawmaking matters whether one 
agrees or disagrees with scholars who doubt FCL’s preemptive force under the 
Supremacy Clause.394 For critics of FCL, a sensible application of the prioritization 
inquiry must distinguish between interpretations of a preemptive text and judicial 
creation of non-preemptive rules. In contrast, prioritization is not difficult for 
supporters of FCL’s preemptive force. But the distinction between interpretation 
and lawmaking remains important even if FCL is preemptive. If judges have a 
precise understanding of what role they are playing—interpreting or creating—they 
are more likely to recognize applicable constraints on their authority. Both 
supporters and skeptics of FCL should agree that focused deliberation is superior 
to muddling through an ill-defined “Erie” analysis. 
Questions about the boundary between interpretation and lawmaking arise in 
multiple contexts. For example, distinct literatures address whether decisionmakers 
are interpreting a text or creating law when: 
• courts enforce “common law statutes”;395 
• courts fill gaps in an otherwise detailed statutory regime, including 
by finding implied preemption of state law;396 
 
393. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 366 
(2002) (noting that “the boundary between” “statutory interpretation” and “federal common 
lawmaking” is “anything but distinct”). Theorists often assume that FCL derives its legitimacy from its 
relationship to a text that authorizes its creation. However, a text might not be necessary to legitimate 
common law drawn from traditional atextual sources. See Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal 
Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015) (noting a “potential distinction between rules that courts 
would be creating out of whole cloth and rules that are firmly grounded in . . . widespread customs, 
traditional principles of common law, or the collective thrust of precedents from across the  
fifty states”). 
394. See citations supra note 153. 
395. Compare Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The 
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 623 (2005) (contending 
that “the statutory texts have considerably more specific meaning than the conventional wisdom 
suggests”), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The 
statute books are full of laws . . . that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”). 
396. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the 
Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 450 (2016) (“Geier’s particular application of implied 
preemption doctrine is barely distinguishable from a claim to have authority to fashion general law.”); 
Monaghan, supra note 153, at 763–65 (critiquing efforts to recharacterize some forms of FCL as 
interpretation rather than lawmaking); cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”); Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 580 (2019) (considering alternatives to the modern “swashbuckling” 
conception of common law judging). 
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• courts develop remedies and prophylactic rules to enforce the 
Constitution;397 
• courts consider whether Congress can overrule a judicial decision 
that created FCL that may or may not have relied on an 
interpretation of the Constitution;398 
• courts use adjudication to embellish rules that should instead be 
amended using notice-and-comment procedures,399 or agencies 
use informal procedures to articulate rules that could be construed 
as “legislative” rather than “interpretive”;400 
• courts or agencies apply texts that include flexible standards that 
vest case-by-case discretion;401 and 
 
397. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) 
(distinguishing between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional doctrine”); Monaghan, supra 
note 382, at 2–3 (“a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is 
best understood as something of a quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and 
remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional 
provisions”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208 (1988) 
(“Under any plausible approach to constitutional interpretation, the courts must be  
authorized—indeed, required—to consider their own, and the other branches’, limitations and 
propensities when they construct doctrine to govern future cases.”). 
398. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 207 (2004) (characterizing prior decisions as 
creating FCL that Congress could abrogate), with id. at 228–31 (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
the same decisions as constitutional interpretation that Congress could not displace). 
399. For example, judicial interpretation of the FRCP vacillates between traditional text-based 
and more “managerial” policy-based approaches. Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL 
L. REV. 123, 125–26 (2015). At the extremes, policy-based interpretations of an REA-rule can seem 
more like an amendment that circumvents the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. See Arthur R. 
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1, 84–89 (2010) (criticizing the Court’s reinterpretation of FRCP pleading standards as an 
end-run around more deliberative and effective rulemaking procedures); cf. BURBANK & FARHANG, 
supra note 292, at 180 (noting that the Supreme Court has used interpretation of the FRCP rather than 
rulemaking to significantly limit private enforcement of rights). The Court might have reached a 
different conclusion in its cases interpreting the FRCP’s pleading standards if it had applied a 
“rulemaker primacy canon” foreclosing adventurous reinterpretations of settled authority. David 
Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH 
L. REV. 927, 984–85. 
400. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96–97 (2015); see also Jacob E. Gerson, 
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1721–22 (2007) (“A main premise of the 
administrative state is that Congress enacts broad general statutes and agencies fill in the details by 
interpreting statutes. This process of gap-filling is interpretation, but in the post-realist post-Chevron 
world it is also policymaking.”); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66  
VAND. L. REV. 465, 472 (2013) (discussing the “gray zone” between policymaking and policy guidance). 
401. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991) 
(noting that “adjudication” can authorize “lawmaking by interpretation”); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen 
Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2208–11 (2017) (discussing 
interpretive methods for addressing discretionary rules); Porter, supra note 399, at 165 (“When the 
Rule’s drafters tied the poetry of equity practice to the prose of the law, they invited the case-specific, 
innately discretionary spirit of equity into the interpretation of many of the Rules.”); cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (“[I]f there is only one reasonable construction of a regulation—then a 
court has no business deferring to any other reading, no matter how much the agency insists it would 
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• agencies seek to revise a prior position even though the underlying 
statute has not changed.402 
Each of these contexts raises idiosyncratic issues. But collectively they implicate 
policy questions that Hanna obscures: When are courts creating rather than 
interpreting law, when is creation appropriate, and what is the status of various kinds 
of judge-created law under the Supremacy Clause? 
c. The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law 
A large literature addresses the legitimacy and content of FCL.403 Questions 
include whether and when Congress can delegate lawmaking authority to courts, the 
extent to which various constitutional provisions authorize FCL, the scope of the 
judiciary’s inherent power, and the optimal relationship between FCL and state law. 
The creation and interpretation inquiries unify these discrete strands of scholarship. 
Each strand addresses the core questions animating the Erie doctrine: Which 
governments, and which institutions within those governments, are authoritative 
sources of binding law? Hanna obscures these questions by asking whether valid 
federal law displaces inconsistent state law. Yet by that point, courts should have 
already completed the most important work because the validity and consistency 
determinations are the most difficult and consequential. Abandoning Hanna’s 
prioritization inquiry in favor of a preemption approach would allow courts and 
commentators to more directly consider FCL’s proper role in the federal system.404 
d. Substance versus Procedure 
Scholars often consider the boundary between substance and procedure in 
various contexts.405 The labels themselves are imprecise. However, the distinction 
may help isolate salient aspects of a problem. For example, perhaps an FCL rule 
that has substantive characteristics might apply in different circumstances than a 
rule with procedural characteristics. This is essentially what the Supreme Court held 
when it concluded that federal forum non conveniens doctrine was procedural and 
 
make more sense. Deference in that circumstance would ‘permit the agency, under 
the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.’”) (citation omitted). 
402. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(characterizing an agency’s revised position as both an “interpretation” and “a reversal of policy”). 
403. See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 135, at 589–94 (discussing competing theories); Tobias 
Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 
1860–78 (2017) (discussing the parallel development of jurisprudence addressing FCL and Erie). 
404. See Perdue, supra note 76, at 754 (“One way to reconcile Erie with federal supremacy is to 
treat the Erie doctrine not as a rule for picking between state and federal law, but instead as a rule for 
determining whether there is a valid federal common law rule applicable in the area.”). 
405. For the classic treatment, see Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the 
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 343 (1933) (“[A] person asking where the line ought to be drawn 
might well conclude that this ought to be at one place for one purpose and at a somewhat different 
place for another purpose.”). Some scholars add a third vector to the substance/procedure  
distinction: remedies. See Hart, supra note 13, at 498. 
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therefore applied in federal admiralty cases, but not in analogous state  
court proceedings.406 
Hanna provides a needlessly roundabout way of addressing the practical 
implications of the substance/procedure distinction. By the time a federal court 
considers prioritization, it assumes that a federal rule conflicts with state law. The 
substance/procedure distinction then becomes an arbitrary way of determining 
priority despite the Supremacy Clause’s content-neutrality. The more interesting and 
important question is whether the conflict actually exists. The substance/procedure 
distinction’s tenacious grasp on judicial imaginations suggests that it might 
communicate some useful information about the existence of conflicts between 
federal and state law. If a federal law seems primarily procedural, maybe courts 
should pause before interpreting it in a way that conflicts with a state law that seems 
substantive. And if a federal law seems primarily substantive, maybe courts should 
not hesitate to find preemption when conflicting state laws seem procedural.407 I 
am not suggesting that the substance/procedure distinction actually is meaningful. 
But if the distinction is unavoidable, courts should address it in a context where it 
can be fruitful rather than distracting. Moving the substance/procedure inquiry 
from the prioritization stage to the interpretation stage would allow courts to 
confront its implications more directly with an eye toward relevant policies.408 
*    *    * 
This Section showed that the Erie doctrine, preemption jurisprudence, and 
FCL are connected in an Escheresque loop implicating several fields of scholarship. 
“Erie” generates creation and interpretation inquiries that address the source and 
scope of federal law and its role in the federal system. “Preemption” jurisprudence 
is a subset of Erie that governs federal law’s interaction with state law. “Federal 
common law” fills the gap when federal law preempts state law without expressly 
providing an alternative, or when federal courts perceive a need for a federal rule. 
Erie’s creation and interpretation components then reemerge to provide tools for 
assessing federal common law’s validity and meaning. As problems move through 
this loop, questions arise about which institutions can create law, the scope of the 
laws that particular institutions can create, and how federal and state law should 
 
406. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994). 
407. In some circumstances, a substantive law may contemplate enforcement through specific 
procedures. Blending state and federal rules in a single case—for example by applying federal 
procedures to a state claim in federal court, or state procedures to a federal claim in state court—may 
therefore frustrate effective implementation of a substantive regulatory scheme. See Sean Farhang, 
Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1529 (2018) 
(noting that Congress often relies on civil litigation as a mechanism for enforcing statutory rights); 
Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2010) 
(“Because substantive law is calibrated to achieve some outcome, fidelity to that law may require that 
it remain hinged to the corresponding procedural law that was presumed its adjunct.”). 
408. Cf. Charles E. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417, 421 (1940) 
(noting in the context of justifying the FRCP’s broad scope that “we must decide the question of 
substance versus procedure, not as one based on any supposed verities of definition, but as one of 
ascertaining and enforcing the policy to be subserved by the distinction”). 
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interact. Doctrinal labels often obscure shared purposes and common themes 
underlying these related inquiries. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article straddles several fields that often inspire trepidation. Federal 
common law seems puzzling, choice of law seems mysterious, and Erie seems 
baffling. Stirring the REA, RDA, and substance/procedure distinction into the mix 
generates further confusion. 
Fragmenting the Erie doctrine into its four components would demystify 
vertical choice of law, eliminate distracting tangents, and facilitate rigorous analysis 
of the questions that actually matter. A granular approach to Erie reveals that the 
prioritization inquiry should enforce the Supremacy Clause, while the creation and 
interpretation inquiries should assess the validity and scope of federal law. Replacing 
the Court’s prioritization jurisprudence with this Article’s framework would 
facilitate nuanced analysis of federal common law’s legitimacy and effects.409 The 
Any Manner clauses and forum non conveniens doctrine illustrate the practical 
importance of carefully considering federal common law’s foundations. More 
generally, the Article’s approach to federal common law reveals connections 
between diverse areas of scholarship in fields such as constitutional law, 
administrative law, and statutory interpretation. 
 
 
409. Reasonable minds can still differ about the propriety of specific FCL rules because 
“[a]nalytic frameworks do not by themselves generate unequivocal answers to hard questions.” John 
Hart Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753, 753 (1974). 
